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ABSTRACT
Throughout the last decade, there have been numerous
innovations in development finance in the State of Massachusetts
attempting to cope with capital market imperfections. The most
notable among these have been the Massachusetts Industrial
Finance Agency, and the Massachusetts Community Development
Finance Corporation. However, the Massachusetts Industrial
Finance Agency provides capital in the range of $500,000 and
above while the Massachusetts Community Development Finance
Corporation provides capital in the range of $100,000 and above.
There are other agencies like the Small Business Administration
that provide loan guarantees of $100,000 and above, but there are
few that meet the capital need for minority small businesses,
particularly those in need of less than $100,000 in financing.
Since private lenders and government agencies have not been
able to fulfill their role in the development process of
minority communities, some have taken the situation into their
own hands by establishing their own financing instrument for
business development.
A capital market perfecting mechanism called a Revolving
Loan Fund (RLF) has been utilized by community-based development
corporation's to efficiently and appropriately place capital in
their communities.
In the summer of 1981, Inquilinos Boricuas En Accion will
initiate its RLF, which was capitalized by local foundations and
corporations. The RLF will.be used to finance minority
businesses in the Inquilinos Boricuas En Accion designated
target area of the South End (see Appendix Two). This client-
oriented thesis provides the program design and management plan
for that RLF considering the goals and objectives, historical
and political development, organizational structure, staff
capacity, and financial resources of the agency. Additionally,
this. thesis.examines the technical assistance needs of minority
small businesses and-presents steps which can be taken to meet
i
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the need. Finally, it provides recommendations to improve
the liklihood of successful implementation of the RLF,
which builds on Inquilinos Boricuas En Accion's twelve
years of experience in community-based housing development
and three years experience in commercial development.
Thesis Supervisor: Melvin King
Title: Adjunct Professor of Urban Studies and
Planning
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INTRODUCTION
In theory, the purpose of the capital market system
in the United States is to allow capital to be put to its most
productive use. Since capital placement is the key to "devel-
opment" it is important that the allocation process is both
efficient and approproate.2 To this end, government and private
agencies formulate and implement policies which they believe
approach a perfect capital market system of allocation.
Unfortunately, capital markets are imperfect despite the
policy makers efforts. Investment policy formulation and
implementation is largely a political process by which govern-
ment agencies and private organizations effect development.
Historically, the politically and economically powerless people,
especially minorities, have been omitted from the policy
formulation and implementation process. As a result, neither
appropriate nor efficient allocation of capital has occurred in
their communities. This phenomenon is called capital market
imperfection. The consequences of these imperfections effect
low and moderate income neighborhoods more severely than other
communities.
In recent times the issue of how to effect the amount and
"form (factories vs. stores, open space vs. human capital, ... )"
of capital placed in poor minority communities has become
extremely important for community-based development organiza-
tions.3 In other words, how to effect the external political
process has become a crucial element in the development process
1
2for community development agencies.
Inquilinos Boricuas en Accion (IBA - Puerto Rican Tenants
in Action) is one such organization. It is a predominantly
Puerto Rican agency which has, since 1969, developed successful
housing, educational and social service programs for minority
residents of the South End of Boston. IBA has been successful
in designing and implementing programs for four reasons:
1. community involvement and direct representation
in the decision making process (self determina-
tion and control);
2. excellent organizational leadership and planning;
3. reinforcement of a strong cultural identity
(pride); and
4. effective organization around immediate
community needs. 4
These were not the only reasons for IBA's success in putting
government and private capital to its most productive use in
their community. However, the four reasons listed above are
essential to this thesis. These factors have made IBA a viable
political force.
In 1977 IBA began its involvement in economic development
activities. Its overall goals were to increase the employment
opportunities for residents, provide necessary commercial and
retail activities for the community, and increase the community's
control of economic resources. The IBA Board of Directors,
representing the broader community, approved the economic devel-
opment goals and the organizational leadership began to guide
3this effort.
Up to 1981 there had been limited success achieved in the
area of business development. IBA is now attempting to expand
its effectiveness by taking a more direct role in the financing
of minority small businesses. It desires to establish a financ-
ing mechanism which will cope with the following capital market
imperfections effecting minority small businesses:
1. Availability of Capital
2. Access to Capital
3. Prejudice
4. Information and Transaction Costs
5. Risk Aversity (Both Real and Perceived)5
Moreover, IBA plans to provide technical assistance (direct and
indirect) to deal with the operational difficulties caused by
management inadequacies:
1. Incompetence or Lack of Managerial Expertise6
2. Lack of Experience7
3. Insufficient Planning and Marketing
4. Staffing
5. Security
A Revolving Loan and Equity Fund (RLF) is the capital
market perfecting mechanism IBA desires to create in order to
address the financial and operational needs of minority small
businesses. The purpose of this client-oriented thesis is
threefold:
1. to define the major problems facing minority
small businesses;
42. to indicate the design and management features
IBA should utilize to effectively meet the
needs of the community and the agency; and
3. to provide specific recommendations to improve
the liklihood of the RLF effecting the private
lenders existing and future capital placement
policies in the South End.
All the RLF program features and recommendations were developed
while considering the capacity of the agency and the financing
limitations of the RLF.
The central argument of this thesis is that IBA, a
community-based organization, has the potential to successfully
correct some of the market imperfections which inhibit the
growth and development of South End minority small businesses.
By using some of the previous elements of their success, and
combining them with the RLF, IBA will be adding another effect-
ive tool to its economic development effort*.
* Note that there are numerous factors that contribute to a
strong economy such as good labor pool, public services, etc.,
but they are beyond the scope of this thesis.
FOOTNOTES 5
Lecture by Belden Daniels, Professor, John F. Kennedy
School Of Public Policy, Harvard University, "Finanincing
Economic Development" course, September, 1980.
2 Stephen Michelson, Community Based Development In Urban
Areas (Binghamton, NY: Conference On Central City
Economic Development, State University of New York at
Binghampton, October, 1977), p. 1.
I.B.I.D.
4 Luz Cuadrado, Housing Development: A Strategy To Advance
The Process Of Barrio Self Determination (Boston, MA:
Inquilinos Boricuas En Accion), p. 6.
5 Daniels Lecture, September, 1980.
6 Curtis F. Tate, Jr., Leon C. Megginson, Charles R. Scott,
Jr., and Lyle R. Trueblood, Successful Small Business
Management (Dallas, TX: Bus iness Publications, Iinc.,
1978), p. 7.
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SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
IN THE SOUTH END
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the problems
facing minority small businesses in the South End. To achieve
this, the following areas are covered:
1. The changes which have taken place in the small
business sector of the South End over the last
three decades (1950 to 1980).
2. The types of existing businesses within IBA's
target area that are owned and operated by
various ethnic groups.
3. The numerous barriers minority small businesses
encounter nationally and in the gentrifying
South End environment.
Since this thesis is primarily concerned with how a Revolving
Loan and Equity Fund (RLF) will effect minority owned and oper-
ated small businesses, light industrial firms are discussed in
general terms because they are not owned by minority entrepre-
neurs. Nevertheless, the role of the light industrial firm in
the South End economic structure is important, especially in
terms of employment. Finally, it should be noted that small
businesses within the context of this paper refers to those
businesses with less than $1,000,000 in assets or sales.
Business Activity In The South End, 7
1950 To 1980
During the 1950's small businesses flourished in the South
End.2 Their success was due to the tremendous number of
customers that frequented their establishments. 3 Because the
population peaked at 57,218 in 1950, it was not surprising that
the small grocery and liquor stores, variety drug, and fast food
establishments were thriving.4 Even though the incomes of most
of the neighborhood residents were low, the amount of customers
kept the volume of goods and services flowing. As a result,
profitability was up. The close relationships and familiarity
of store owners with customers facilitated an informal system of
crediting which increased the customer's ability to purchase. 5
Mr. Syvalia Hyman, Executive Director of the United South
End/Lower Roxbury Development Corporation stated, when descri-
bing the South End during the 1950's, that "There were stores
on every corner," and along streets like Massachusetts Avenue,
Tremont, Columbus, and Washington Streets, rows of stores
crowded the lower floors of row houses. The ubiquity of stores
provided the residents with a convenient and often pleasurable
shopping experience, similar to the way that shopping malls
provide human scale, visual stimulation, and security.
According to Ms. Elaine Etheridge, a resident of Roxbury,
there were also a number of famous bars and restaurants in the
area during this time. The South End "was the place to be if
you were Black." Black jazz musicians and dancers would perform
8at the local clubs and add a tremendous amount of gaiety to the
sometimes depressing social and economic environment. Some
South End residents described the neighborhood as the "Harlem of
Boston." Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) statistics from
1950 indicate that Blacks composed roughly 33% (roughly 19,000)
of the total population of the South End (see Appendix One). In
terms of concentration and percentage of population of Blacks in
a Boston neighborhood, the South End was indeed "Boston's Harlem."
Like Harlem, the South End community contained many small
establishments owned and operated by Blacks. In addition to
having businesses, many of these Black entrepreneurs owned homes
in the South End, so money was often reinvested directly or
indirectly into the community.6
Other ethnic groups like the Greeks, Lebanese, Irish,
Chinese, Syrians, and Jews also owned and operated stores in the
neighborhood.7 . Similarly, many of them lived near their stores
and hired relatives or neighors to operate them.
Another major portion of the local economy were the light
industrial firms which were located in the southern "one-third"
of the South End. These manufacturing firms were producing
clothing, textile goods, leather products, furniture, and
machinery for local or regional consumption. Many of the labor-
ers working in these factories were South End residents and
could walk from their homes to their jobs below Washingting
Street. 9
In many ways the local economy could have been viewed as
healthy. Nonetheless, the social and economic conditions of the
9residents were horrendous. 1 0 Health problems were wide spread.
Inadequate heating, plumbing, and ventilation were often
identified as the main causes of these problems. Overcrowding
in the homes and rooming houses exacerbated these difficulties.
South End Settlement Houses served as a housing alternative for
many immigrant families but could not serve everyone.12 As a
result, privately owned dwellings were "jammed" with people. To
the surprise of many, the South End was one of the most crowded
lodging areas in the United States toward the end of the
1950's. 1 3
However, by the beginning of 1960, the population of the
South End dwindled to 34,956.14 This 39% decline in population
alleviated some problems but also created new ones. In the
area of housing overcrowding was reduced, but in the area of
minority owned and operated small businesses, it created voids.
The drastic reduction in population limited the number of small
businesses that could operate profitably in the area. Some of
the establishments moved with their markets to neighborhoods
such as Roxbury, Jamaica Plain, and the Fenway, while others
went out of business altogether.15 There were even some that
moved to the suburbs during this decade. Conversely, some of
the manufacturing firms relocated to other areas where resources
and land were readily available.
Federal housing construction and transportation policies
of the 1950's caused much of the demographic and economic out-
migration. Simply put, the paved highways to the suburbs
provided easy access by automobile and eventually led to the
10
continued "white flight" in the sixties.
Most Blacks living in the South End did not move to
another area. This is evident from the population change
between 1950 and 1960 (see Appendix One). In absolute numbers
the White population dropped by 16,000, while the Black popula-
tion dropped by only 5,000. This affected the character of the
retail and commercial small business community. Those businesses
which met the demands of the modified market survived. Many of
these establishments were ethnic food stands, barber shops, drug
stores, liquor stores, and bars. However, their profits de-
clined because the volume of customers declined.
Because the incomes of most of the minority residents were
low, the profitability of these small businesses declined.
Moreover, the exteriors and interiors of the establishments
began to show signs of severe deterioration. They could not
keep up the maintenance on their businesses because of declining
profits and financing of rehabilitation was next to impossible
to obtain from banks because of the risk associated with the
South End.16 The high crime rate and weak real estate market
kept many lenders out of the neighborhood.
A cause of the weak real estate market was the out-migra-
tion of businesses. The exodus of businesses left many of the
store fronts of the lower floors of row houses empty.17 Once
these places were boarded up, they added to the deterioration
of the general environment. This blighting influence made the
survival of the remaining small business community even more
difficult. Customers that might have stopped at a store along
a thoroughfare like Massachusetts Avenue or Tremont Street could
11
have been repulsed by the appearance of the store fronts. One
factor which further eroded the economic viability of small
businesses was the absentee ownership of property.18 Often the
owners of buildings would collect rent for their property and
spend little or no money on maintenance and/or improvement.1 9
The attachment to the community was severed so reinvestment did
not occur at previous levels.
The reduced volume of customers, the drop in the disposable
income of the overall population, and the blighting influence of
vacant and abandoned property all contributed to the marginal
performance of the remaining small businesses, many of which
were, by this time, owned or operated by minority entrepreneurs.
By the middle 1960's the BRA had drawn up an Urban Renewal
Plan. This plan had no program for assisting the existing small
businesses.20 The lack of a unified business community, more
than likely, can be identified as one of the causes of this cir-
cumstance. Housing was the most politically volatile issue in
the South End. Thus, the BRA addressed it first.
The late 1960's was a difficult time for the neighborhood
as a result of political struggles that occurred over housing.
Even though the needs of the small business community were
great, they were not addressed. Regardless of the circumstances,
new Puerto Rican owned and operated small businesses opened that
served the needs of the Puerto Rican community.2 1
1970 to 1980 was a decade of transition of the South End
neighborhood. Middle and upper income Whites began moving into
the neighborhood, and their numbers grew from 41% to 46%. The
12
Hispanic population increased 7% to 19%. However, the Black
population decreased from 39% to 29%, and the Chinese popula-
tion declined from 13% to 6%. The new white residents brough
with them a large amount of disposable income and a set of new
demands, while the Puerto Ricans took control of the land on
which they lived.
During the middle 1970's, IBA began to address the issues
of minority small business development. In order to address
these issues, IBA retained the services of BFH and Associates,
Inc. of Cambridge, Massachusetts. Through a sample survey of
the local businesses and residents, BFH and Associates identified
some of the problems which have occurred as a result of the
rapidly changing market demands.
The first and probably most significant fact that BFH and
Associates uncovered was that "75% of the consumers surveyed had
a negative impression of the South End businesses.' Second,
shopping for apparel is done almost exclusively outside the
community. Third, 60% of the population purchases groceries
outside of the neighborhood. Finally, the lack of security and
fear of crime are deterrants to South End shopping." 2 3
From these survey results taken in 1976, it is shown that
the business community's image is negative because the stores
are perceived by shoppers as dirty, unsightly, and understocked.
A 1978 Consensus Survey indicates that these facts were still
true two years later. In the Consensus Survey "the most common
complaints concerned high prices, inferior merchandise, shabby
or dirty stores, and lack of variety of stores and merchandise." 2 4
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The fact that almost all shopping for clothes and 60% of
the shopping for groceries is done outside the community displays
dissatisfaction with the products and services being offered by
businesses. To make matters worse, the fear of crime inhibits
the shopping of residents. A mismatch of supply and demand has
resulted from the demographic change. 2 5
BFH and Associates performed an analysis of the buying
power of South End residents and found that $43,380,000 was the
market area retail spending power in 1975. Only a small portion
of this is being spent in the South End. The inability of small
retail and commercial business to meet new demands is preventing
these small businesses from profiting from the disposable income
of new residents.
The survey activity took place in the IBA designated retail
trade area (see Appendix Two). At the time when this survey was
performed there were 134 businesses in this area.2
6 This is less
than half of the estimated 365 small businesses in the South End
geographic area.27 Many of these businesses are minority owned
and operated, and are targeted for assistance by IBA's RLF.
In any case, BFH and Associates' survey revealed that
there is sizeable demand for the following:
- supermarkets
- shoe stores
- men's clothiers
- women's clothiers
- laundrymats
- bakeries
14
- beauty shops
while there appears to be an oversaturation of:
- eating places
- florists
- dry cleaners
- liquor stores
- barber shops
- family clothing stores
- meat and poultry stores 2 8
(see Appendix Three).
Since the small businesses were not able to adjust to
changing markets, competitors have entered the community to
cater to the demands of the gentry. For instance, during the
latter part of the 1970's antique shops, prestigious real
estate offices, elegant restaurants, and jazz nightclubs have
opened up along the borders of the most affluent census tracts
(see Appendices Four and Five). Professor Tunney Lee of MIT
has stated that one of the final steps in the process of gentri-
fication is the replacement of old businesses by new businesses.
The final steps have not taken place in all parts of the IBA
target area, as is illustrated in the following section.
Present Business Environment
Of IBA's Target Area
In the Regional/Urban Design Assistance Teams study (May,
1980), there are references to activity centers which should
15
receive special attention. Four of the five activity areas fall
into the retail and RLF target area designated by IBA (see
Appendix Six). These areas have been centers of economic acti-
vity for a large portion of the minority entrepreneurs of the
South End. IBA purposely chose this area to implement an RLF
because of this feature.
Presently, in the South End, there are over 200 minority
owned or operated businesses.29 Most of these businesses fall
into IBA's retail trade and RLF target area. Below, entrepren-
eurs are identified by ethnic background and the type of busi-
ness usually owned or operated:
Afro-American - hardware and liquor stores, restaurants,
and florists shops.
Chinese - Restaurants.
Greeks - Sandwich shops, grocery stores.
Puerto Ricans - Laundrymats, furniture, variety, fish, and
grocery stores, travel agencies, and
restaurants.
Syrians - Restaurants.
Whites - Pharmacies, sandwich shops, restaurants,
liquor and antique stores, real estate
offices, and banks. 3 0
Most of the minority owned businesses are referred to as
"marginal" in the BFH and Associates report because of high
priced merchandise, shabby appearance, and soiled interior.
Unfortunately, the profitability of these businesses is lowered
as a result of these problems. A method of overcoming the
16
physical appearance is through upgrading. In many cases it is
estimated that a ten to twenty thousand dollar loan would provide
enough capital to upgrade the interior and exterior.
The risky nature of these small businesses has caused
banks to avoid making loans to these establishments. Without
previous credit it is difficult to obtain financing for upgrad-
ing. The majority of the minority businesses are financed
through personal savings, family, and friends. Financing is one
of the greatest barriers to small business development, and it
will be covered in greater depth in the following section.
Besides having difficulty with adjusting to the new market
there is a future threat to minority small businesses along
Tremont and Columbus Streets. The BRA is closing its Urban
Renewal Project. By finalizing the close-out process the BRA
must complete its public works projects which include extensive
reconstruction of the Tremont and Columbus thoroughfares.31 At
present, according to the South End Environmental Assessment,
BRA, Spring, 1979, there will be an adverse impact from the
reconstruction activity. The BRA expects eighteen businesses
to be displaced. 32 Additionally, Mr. Syvalia Hyman
of the United South End/Lower Roxbury Development Corporation
(U.D.C.) points out that small business sales can be reduced
from 25% to 50% from this construction work. This type of
reduction in gross sales can destroy small businesses.
Problems In Small Business Development 17
Before discussing the negative aspects of small business
it is important to point out the following facts:
1. "66% of the replacement (new) jobs are created
by enterprises employing fewer than twenty
employees.
2. More than 50% are generated by small independent
firms.
3. Fully 80% are created by establishments four
years of age. Relatively few replacement (new)
jobs are created by middle-sized and large
firms." 3 3
4. Small businesses produce people as well as goods
and services for the economic system.3 4
Besides having these positive attributes, Professor Belden
Daniels of the John F. Kennedy School of Public Policy, Harvard
University, points out that more than 60% of new innovations
occur in small businesses. The photocopying process is just
one example. In addition to providing jobs and innovations in
technology, small businesses make up 86% of all corporations
and 58% of all other businesses.35 In other words, approximately
"95% of all business enterprises in the United States are class-
ified as small."36 It is because of these facts that small
businesses are vital to the American economic system.37 The
purpose of this section, however, is to indicate the problems
in small business, both nationally, and in the South End.
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There are many barriers which inhibit the development of
small business in the South End. These barriers can be divided
into two categores: financing and operating. The financial
problems tend to concentrate in the area of obtaining capital
for the purpose of improving the appearance or functioning of
the establishment.3 8 Operational problems center around the
entrepreneur's managerial capabilities. 3 9
In this section the following financial barriers are
delineated and discussed:
1. "Availability of Capital.
2. Access to Capital.
3. Prejudice.
4. Information and Transaction Costs.
5. Risk Aversity (Both Real and Perceived). "0
Moreover, to fully reveal the difficulties small businesses face,
the following operational problems are explained:
1. Incompetence or Lack of Managerial Expertise. 1
2. Lack of Experience.42
3. Insufficient Planning and Marketing.
4. Staffing.
5. Security.
The above-mentioned problems are by no means common to the
minority small businesses of the South End. Most of these
problems are typical of the estimated 13,000,000 small busi-
43
nesses in the United States. Tate et al, in Successful Small
Business Management, state that these problems are common and
as a result "the threat of failure is ever present." For
19
instance, "The Service Corps of Retired Executives (SCORE), a
group of retired business executives who perform the public
service of aiding and advising small business managers, has
estimated that about 400,000 small business firms go out of
business each year in the United States, and 100,000 of these
fail in their first year." 4 4
With statistics like these it is not surprising that
minority businesses in the South End would be in need of assist-
ance, especially in view of the fact that they have to fight
racial prejudice as well. Unlike their White counterparts,
minority entrepreneurs have traditionally had a disproportionate
amount of difficulty in obtaining financing.5
Financing Barriers
Availability of Capital
Capital for small business development comes in many
forms:
- short term (less than one year)
- intermediate term (from one to five years)
- long term (more than five years)
- equity (ownership with no fixed interest or
principle)
- debt (bond obligations, fixed interest, and
principle)
- subordinated debt (a loan which is junior to
the senior loan)
20
- convertible subordinated debentures ( a junior
loan which can be convereted to common stock)
These are the most common forms. 4 6 The types of financing which
apply to the minority small businesses of the South End fall in
the equity, short, intermediate, and long term financing cate-
gories.
Each of these four types of financing have risk associated
with them. The most risky is the equity mode of financing.
Equity is basically ownership. The person who invests equity
has purchased part of the business. On the one hand, if the
business is profitable the investment can yield great returns.
On the other hand, if the business is not profitable it can bring
about great losses. Because of the tremendous risk involved in
equity investing bankers and lenders do not provide this form of
financing for small businesses. In most cases, the entrepreneur
and/or his family and friends provide the equity to leverage
other capital.
Banks, savings and loans, and commercial credit agencies
normally provide short, intermediate, and long term financing
for small businesses. The majority of these loans are secured
by the asset of the small business owners' property or property
of the small business corporation. Collateralization of land,
plant, equipment, or other fungible assets is usually used to
secure these loans. Even though for the most part these are
senior loans, the desire for a "sure" return on the loan is the
lender's objective (note that secured senior loans are the least
risky of financing modes).
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Speaking in relative terms, among senior loans, short term
debt is the least risky to lend to small businesses because the
pay back period is from one to five years. Long term loans are
the most risky. When financing small businesses bankers and
lenders are cognizant of the fact that the Small Business Ad-
ministration (SBA) reports that 40% of all small businesses fail
within their first year, 65% fail within the first five years,
and 90% fail within ten years. Statistical evidence such as
this has caused many potential lenders to avoid lending to
small business entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, risk is associated
with the size of the business establishment.
As a result, commercial banks, savings and loans, commer-
cial credit companies, factoring companies, sales finance
companies, and leasing consulting companies limit their capital
47
available to finance phases of small business operations. In
fact, commercial banks, commercial credit and factoring compan-
ies supply the majority of- small business'development funds.
Another contributing factor which prevents mutual savings
banks and savings and loans from providing short and inter-
mediate term financing is a legal ceiling on the percentage of
their loan portfolio which can be invested in commercial acti-
vities and the limited business and finance expertise of their
staff.48 Most of their funds are in the area of housing. Con-
sequently, the long term financing that they sometimes provide
to small businesses is usually a real estate mortgage.
The South End area has had tremendous problems obtaining
financing from banks because of the availability problem.
22
Commitment from banks and lenders to the area is marginal to
non-existent according to the Merchants Association of the South
49End. The First National Bank of Boston is presently making
funds available through its Urban Marketing Division, but this
is only a recent development.50 Traditionally, commercial banks
have avoided the small businesses of the South End, or have
denied applicants loans on the basis of inadequate credit ra-
tings51 which brings us to our next barrier to obtaining
financing.
Access to Capital
Even if capital is available to small businesses from
lending institutions, the entrepreneur is not always able to
obtain these funds. Some of the most common reasons for denial
of financing are:
- inadequate credit history
- insufficient financial records
- low profitability
- lack of experience (typical of start-ups)
- improper planning
- inadequate collateralization5 2
These are some of the more common problems in accessing the
capital which is available for small businesses. Each area
itemized is vital to the successful management of a small busi-
ness. Therefore, it is understandable that lenders deny many
23
entrepreneurs financing because of failure to meet these
criteria. However, there are a few which fall into a "Catch 22"
situation. For example, a person cannot establish a credit
history without borrowing, or provide capital without being able
to leverage and accumulate capital assets.
The South End minority entrepreneurs have been denied loans
on the basis of some of the above mentioned criteria.53 Because
the prospective small business borrowers have not been able to
provide the necessary documentation to obtain loans, or have not
had the appropriate formal training, the bank denies loans. But
when all of the criteria are met, other factors effect access.
In the case of minority small business persons, this factor is
racial prejudice.
Prejudice
Professor Belden Daniels stated during a lecture at the
John F. Kennedy School of Public Policy at Harvard University
that "Prejudice, or rather, prejudgment" of racial groups,
legal cooperative structures, and locations have caused capital
market imperfections. Professor Daniels, previously President
of the First National Bank of Boston, pointed out one of the
underlying causes of this prejudice. He states that the "cul-
ture" of the banking and lending institutions has given the
individuals functioning within their boundaries a biased per-
spective. It is this biased perspective that causes the
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prejudgment, and subsequently, the resulting capital market
imperfection.
One of Professor Daniels' suggestions is to create
government regulatory mechanisms which would rectify the situ-
ation - regulations which would require a financial institution
to lend a percentage within a neighborhood, city or region.
His recommendations are valid and perhaps may materialize in the
future. Furthermore, he suggests some type of subsidy or incen-
tive to reduce lenders' overhead costs for information and
transaction costs on these prejudged small businesses.
Undoubtedly, minority entrepreneurs of the South End have
encountered the "cloud" of prejudice in their endeavor to obtain
financing. However, it is very difficult to prove. Only a
comparative analysis of a similar neighborhood with a small
business mix like that of the South End might reveal that banks
are prejudging. Indirect measures are the only tools which
could indicate this difficulty.
Information
It is said that the major cause of a bank's prejudging or
"prejudiced" lending policy has more to do with the cost of
information and transaction than it has to do with race.54
Nationally, some believe that businesses are viewed in the same
manner as high fashion by bankers and lenders. Specifically,
the business that is in vogue receives the most investment.
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High technology industries, as a rule, receive a tremendous
amount of attention in the financial world today. They are the
"Yves Saint Laurent" in the business world of the 1980's.
Their profits are high and the return on investment has, in
many cases, far surpassed the rate of inflation.
As a result of their popularity, much information has been
produced on how to analyze their financial soundness and invest-
ment potential. More importantly, within the firms and the
financial institutions, numerous forms and procedures have been
standardized. Business profiles of high technology firms play
a dual role of marketing the firm and displaying its financial
potential to bankers and lending institutions. Of course, the
standard auditing procedures and cash flow projections are still
required; nevertheless, the system has become streamlined.
This is not the case for most small businesses of today.
Mundane firms like tent manufacturers do not receive the neces-
sary capital partially because of the unfamiliarity of the firm
to lenders. 5 5
This situation is exacerbated when one looks at the small
service providing industries like meat markets and variety
stores which serve a minority population. Insufficient
knowledge of the market demands may cause a bank to deny
financing.
Specifically, lack of information about the minority
entrepreneur is a more significant factor. To illustrate this
point, a South End welder attempted to open a laundrymat in the
IBA commercial space on the lower floor of one of their buil-
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dings. He attempted to obtain conventional financing
from a bank and was denied. Denial was based on the fact that
he was inexperienced in this business. His inexperience, how-
ever, did not prevent him from eventually developing a profit-
able laundrymat in the IBA commercial space. A Commercial
Development Component staff member at IBA, Hector Melendez, and
other individuals, researched the welder's personal and financial
background and found him to be quite capable. After extensive
negotiation with Maytag, financing was obtained and the laundry-
mat was operationalized.
If the Commercial Development Component staff at IBA did
not research the welder's personal and financial history in a
more in depth manner, the laundrymat would not exist today, and
a vital service would be denied the community. The cost of
obtaining this additional, more insightful information, however,
is higher than banks will bear, especially in a minority com-
munity.
Risk Aversity (Real or Perceived)
The lack of information often leads to another cause of
market imperfection - risk aversity. In the world of investment
small businesses are viewed as risky. Often, the smaller a
business is, the greater is the association with risk. This is
especially true of new small businesses. The fear of investing
results from the volatile nature (i.e. failure rate) of small
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businesses discussed in the preceding section.
For small minority businesses like those in the South
End, risk aversity is definitely a factor in the lending policy
of financial institutions. Inexperienced minority entrepreneurs
are not perceived as a sound investment, especially in an area
of rapid change. "Even those minority entrepreneurs that are
experienced and supply the necessary documentation have trouble
obtaining financing from banks," states an entrepreneur in the
South End Merchants Association.
A loan officer of the First National Bank of Boston states
that "'Collections' is a messy business at times, so we try to
avoid bad lending. No loan officer wants to have a bunch of
risky loans because of the extensive work involved if the loans
default." Because the banks do not research the effectiveness
of small business, qualified applicants are denied financing
assistance.
The purpose of IBA's RLF is to reduce the cost of inform-
ation and transaction. By reducing these costs it will lower
risk aversity and prejudice, and result in greater access of
capital to minority small business ventures. This approach
can begin to correct capital market imperfections which plague
the South End.
Operating Problems
In the area of operations, small businesses suffer
extensively. Often this suffering ends in failure.
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Incompetence, or Lack of Managerial Expertise
Statistically speaking, incompetence ranks highest among
causes of failure. From a sample of 9,915 business failures in
1974, 40% resulted from incompetence.57 Incompetence of manage-
ment manifests itself in the poor operation of the business.
Since the life blood of a business is its method cf operation,
inadequate management often results in failure.
A small staff with one entrepreneur/manager is fine if that
person is not specialized. However, if he does not understand
some accounting, inventory control, marketing, public relations,
and motivation techniques, he will undoubtedly encounter diffi-
culties. Sometimes a decision on a purchase order can upset a
small business cash flow for months. Similarly, a lack of
coordination of workers can result in a tremendous drop in pro-
duction or service provision. The talents of a small business
manager have to be many and varied to avoid these mistakes.
In the South End there are numerous establishments that do
not have a "decent record keeping system."58 These businesses
do function, but at a marginal capacity. Simple worker organi-
zation or coordination problems often cause customers to be
mishandled or goods to be damaged unnecessarily. Clearly, these
factors contribute to the marginal profit rate.
Through an educational program some of these problems which
plague small businesses can be overcome, but without some sort
of technical assistance they may eventually go out of business.
The intelligent, responsible, honest, considerate, organized,
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motivated, diligent, informative, consistent, respectful,
creative, and positive thinking entrepreneur is usually the
59
one that succeeds. All of these positive characteristics
are not necessary, but they are valuable for the purpose of
keeping businesses viable. Many of these characteristics can
be learned more quickly than accounting or inventory control,
and can lead to a more smoothly operated establishment.
Lack of Experience, or Imbalanced Experience
As with managerial competence, it is vital that a small
business manager possess balanced experience in the venture
which he or she operates. That is to say, the manager must
understand the purpose, objectives, and operations of the
business. If the operation of the firm entails five phases,
each phase should be understood. Knowing only two phases of
operation can mean that numerous unforseen difficulties can
arise. Conversely, having no knowledge of the operations of a
firm can be compared to dealing with the unknown.
Possessing knowledge of only the production of wood pal-
lots, for example, could cause inadequate sales, heavy operating
expenses, or other serious inventory problems.60 By the same
token, knowing only the purchasing and sales aspect of the wood
pallot industry could cause production problems. Either situa-
tion could mean the death of the business.
Minority entrepreneurs of the South End, like most small
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business persons, do possess some knowledge of the business
they run, but it is seldom that one finds them having a
balanced knowledge. The welder-turned-laundrymat owner dis-
cussed earlier had a limited knowledge of the number of finan-
cial and managerial tasks involved in operating an laundrymat.
The fact that he occupied another job as a full time welder
served to increase the amount of time it took him to learn how
to operate and manage a business. A strong market for the
service and an IBA technical assistance team should receive much
of the credit for this venture's success.
At present, there are approximately ten entrepreneurs
attempting to start a business in the commercial space of IBA's
Plaza Betances. These eight individuals do.not have extensive
backgrounds in the areas they desire to enter. Consequently,
they will probably encounter serious problems associated with
business start-up, such as organization of tasks, provision of
services, documentation of sales and transactions, and estab-
lishment of lines of credit. An educational and technical
training process is necessary to avoid these costly problems.
Insufficient Planning and Marketing
Planning is a process of "developing a road map which
indicates one's present position and the path necessary to
reach some position in the future."61 Even though planning
does not tell one how to operate a business, it provides a guide
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to prevent one from experiencing the unexpected. Projections
of monthly cash clows and break even analyses provide a set of
indicators to reveal possible problems which may occur.
Business plans are not commonly used by minority entre-
preneurs of the South End. Often, the plans seem cumbersome and
complex to the average small business manager. This type of
discouragement can lead to business death, particularly if the
market analysis is also overlooked.
Insufficient planning is a major fault of many small
businesses. Unplanned growth, unexpected cash flow, fall off
from seasonal cycles, and recent: competition from nearby
businesses are just a few of the circumstances that could be
avoided by researching and planning the progress of a business.
Ineffective or insufficient marketing can.make a business
plan irrelevant. Therefore, it is imperative that a market
analysis be conducted. This analysis should include the local
competition, demographic mix of the area, and the dollar market
demand for the product or service. Unfortunately, the typical
small firm does not conduct an extensive market analysis. A
poor or nonexistent market analysis can cause one to perceive
a market which does not exist. Misperceptions of this type have
caused numerous failures.
South End minority entrepreneurs usually fail to analyse
their markets sufficiently.62 They often rely upon the per-
ceptions of family and friends to analyze their market. Basing
a business on a few conversations with family and friends is
commonplace, and often causes minority entrepreneurs to
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altogether miss the larger non-minority market.
Staffing
Tn many cases, the entrepreneur/manager hires relatives
and friends regardless of their previous experience.63 This
process of placing unqualified persons in positions in which
they are incapable of handling often leads to conflict and
disorganization. Confusion can spread through the business and
bring service provision and/or production to a standstill. It
should be noted that hiring policy does not need to be "cut and
dry" but a level of credibility must be maintained if the
business is to survive.
Staffing minority small businesses in the South End
usually follows the "relatives and friends" pattern of hiring.
This has probably caused some difficulties in the optimal func-
tioning of the business. Family conflicts can sometimes be
observed during business hours.
Although there are negative consequences to the
"relatives and friends" pattern of hiring, there are also
positive consequences. First, when a family member is a part
of the income generating aspect of a family, his or her role
becomes more vital. This can be observed in the Chinese and
Hispanic restaurants. Secondthe minority businesses often
hire minority employees, and because of this, they meet a
community need for jobs. Finally, aquisition of responsibility
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and some training takes place in these contexts. The
transferrable job experience such as inventorying, accounting,
and salesmanship can serve as a leveraging tool for the person
to enter into employment with other establishments.
Security
Nationally, the security of a small business has not been
the primary cause of failure. Less than .09% has caused failure
in small businesses.64 Therefore, it is not a very significant
matter to grapple with. Nevertheless, in the South End, the
lack of security has become a major problem. Armed robbery,
vandalism, pilferage, and other criminal assaults have caused
tremendous costs to be incurred by the entrepreneur/manager.
More importantly, the shopping patterns of residents have been
modified to cope with the perceived violent criminal environ-
ment.65 This has resulted in the loss of potential sales. All
of the operational problems can be overcome through direct or
indirect technical assistance by IBA's RLF staff.
Conclusion
In the preceding section the financial and operational
problems small businesses encounter nationally and in the South
End are identified. The manner in which these difficulties
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manifest themselves is presented through illustration. These
problems all must be addressed to some extent in order to bring
about viable small business development. However, before deal-
ing with the issue of small business development, one must
understand how IBA views economic development. Furthermore, the
manner in which the organization has evolved over time is im-
portant to understand its approach to correcting capital market
imperfections.
The-next chapters summarize the history of IBA to exempli-
fy the evolution of the agency and delves into the Commercial
Development Component of the agency and its present program for
dealing with financial and managerial problems.
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INQUILINOS BORICUAS EN ACCION
(Puerto Rican Tenants In Action)
Inquilinos Boricuas en Accion (IBA) has a target area
which covers approximately twenty-five acres in the South'End
of Boston.1 Its boundaries roughly consist of Upton Street to
the east, Washington Street to the south, West Newton Street to
the West, and Tremont Street to the north (see Appendix Seven).
The main offices are located at 405 Shawmut Avenue in a six
storey, 6,000 square foot building. Within this building are
many of IBA's community development programs. Specifically,
they are:
1. Casa Del Sol - an adult educational program.
2. Areyto - a cultural/educational program.
3. Human Services program.
4. Commercial Development Program.
In addition, the offices of the Housing Development
Director, the Executive Director, Assistant Director, Special
Assistant to thu Director, Accountant, and their support staff
are housed in this building.
Other programs of IBA are located within the Plaza
Betances (see Appendix Seven). On the lower floor of the mid-
rise building is the Credit Union, a for-profit affiliate of
IBA and the first Hispanic financial institution in Massachu-
setts, the Residential Security Program, Esquelita Agueybana,
a day care facility, and a Cable Television studio, a part of
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the Areyto program. Across the plaza in the lower floor of
Unity Tower is the headquarters of the Emergency Tenant
Council Management, Inc., (ETC), while on the second floor are
the facilities of the Elderly Program. Finally, at 630 Tremont
Street are the offices of the Community Organizing/Crime Pre-
vention Program. All these programs along with neighborhood
associations and recreational groups thrive in this small
geographic area.
The Villa Victoria community's present population is
approximately 2,000.2 Most of this population dwells in the
625 units of new and rehabilitated housing stock. There are
presently 350 IBA members (each member is approximately eighteen
years of age or older and pays one dollar a year for dues). 54%
of the residents of Villa Victoria are Puerto Rican, 19% are
3
Black, 18% are White, and 7% are Chinese. Below is a list of
the location, number of units, type, and date of housing com-
pletion:
1. "Tremont/Shawmut Rehabilitation Project -
seventy-one units of rehabilitated historic
rowhouses for families under HUD Section 236,
1971 to 1972.
2. West Newton Street Rehabilitation Project -
136 units for families under the public housing
program, 1973.
3. Unity Tower/Plaza Betances -
201 units for the elderly and handicapped, 1974.
4. Viviendas La Victoria I -
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181 units for families under Section 236, 1976.
5. Casa Boringuen Scattered Sites Rehabilitation
Project -
thirty-six rehabilitated units for families
under Section 8 and state financing, 1977."
There are also 190 units of housing and 8,000 square feet of
commercial space under construction. This housing and commer-
cial space will be completed in the fall of 1981.5
In summation, the IBA Villa Victoria community is a
racially diverse section of the South End, with a large tenant
population. However, unlike most large tenant developments,
it has extensive ammenities and services for residents. This
total environment has been growing for more than a decade and
has developed into a sophisticated social and political enclave.
IBA's development is discussed in the following section.
Oricgin
During the early 1960's the Boston Redevelopment Authority
(BRA) was heavily involved in developing and implementing fed-
eral and local urban renewal plans and programs. Because of the
BRA's West End demolition activities surrounding the development
of the Prudential Center in the early 1960's, numerous people
voiced their concerns about the BRA planning process, particu-
larly in the South End. The South End residents did not want
to experience the type of wholesale displacement like that of
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the West End residents.
Unlike the West End Urban Renewal Plan, the South End Plan
was developed from a lengthy process which involved unprecedented
levels of community participation. Hundreds of meetings were
held with approximately 150 neighborhood organizations.6 Never-
theless, the Puerto Rican, Black, White, and Chinese low income
residents of Parcel 19 were not consulted.7
As a result, the South End Urban Renewal Plan of 1965 met
with tremendous opposition by the residents of Parcel 19 once
they became aware of its ramifications.8 In brief, the plan
called for large scale displacement of Parcel 19 residents.
Roughly eighty per cent (1,150) of the 1,450 residents would have
been displaced by the BRA's proposed slum clearance. 9
Since many of the Parcel 19 inhabitants were immigrants
arriving from Puerto Rico, the southern United States, and other
parts of the world, within the previous decade their level of
organization and political sophistication was low.10 Therefore,
the first priority was to develop an organization to represent
the people of Parcel 19. The Emergency Tenants Council (ETC), a
group of Parcel 19 residents, held an informal series of meet-
ings during the spring and summer of 1967 with the help of
Helen Morton, a long time South End resident, and Reverend
William Dwyer of St. Stephen's Church.11
From these meetings which focused their dialogue around the
BRA's plans for Parcel 19, the need for a more intensive organi-
zational effort arose. "By the end of the summer of 1967 those
involved in the meetings at St. Stephen's were considering the
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possibility of forming a church sponsored, non-profit housing
corporation with the emphasis on providing low rent housing
units for large families and individuals (church sponsorship
was the type of arrangement the BRA approved) 12
As with many organizing efforts during the late 1960's the
effort gained support from groups like the Cooperative Metropo-
litan Ministers, Inc., Urban Field Service (Harvard Student
Placement Service), and Volunteers in Service to America.1 3
Two seminarians, Richard Lampert and Houston Horn, both bi-
lingual, were the first to begin going door to door organizing
the community. During the process of organizing the community
Richard Lampert began to see the need for the community to con-
trol its own destiny. In August of 1968, a year after the
initial meetings, a dramatic shift occurred - St. Stephen's
Church did not become the housing sponsor. Instead, the entire
community was incorporated and designated the sponsor to control
the process of low and moderate income housing development in
Parcel 19. The ETA, the organization that eventually became
known as IBA, was incorporated in August, 1968, and Richard
Lambert was named the Executive Director.14
Organizational Development
Though respected in the community, Richard Lambert was not
a professional organizer, so, in the fall of 1968, Israel
Feliciano, a professional organizer, was hired.15 In Eric
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Berne's The Structures and Dynamics of Organizations and Groups,
he states that "The psychological leader is the one who is most
powerful in the private structures of the members." Israel
Feliciano was such a leader. He was the first charismatic
Puerto Rican leader the people of Parcel 19 ever had, and as a
result, he stimulated the residents to begin organizing them-
selves.16 The difference between self-organization and being
organized is what catalyzed the collective action movement of
the residents. Finally, Feliciano's focus on addressing the
immediate social service needs of the people resulted in large
scale participation. "It is a well known fact that addressing
the short term needs of people sustains the momentum of
collective action. 17
"In February, 1969, ETC held its first annual convention,
which was attended by 500 residents" and received extensive
media coverage.18 Elections were held and the first formal
corporate steering. committee was formed. "It consisted of six
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Puerto Rican and four English speaking residents.
The following goals stated in the summer of 1967 were to
be promoted by ETC:
1. Low rents for lower income families and the
elderly.
2. An adequate supply of multi-family housing.
3. Scattered site public housing.
4. More stores in and near the area.
5. Improvements of the Blackstone Park and more
playground supervision. 20
45
These goals represented a milestone on the residents' path to
community development.
Israel Feliciano, filling his leadership role, wrote to
Hale Champion, a BRA administrator, saying:
It is our desire to work with the Boston
Redevelopment Authority and the City of
Boston... Your action will determine
whether we will be able to do this or not.
The responsibility is upon you. If we are
designated 'Sponsor Redeveloper' the re-
sponsibility will be ours. We fully
realize the difficulties we shall encounter.
We have acquired competent technical and
ample financial resources to guarantee
success... We want the responsibility to
determine our destiny, we are tired of
other people making our decisions.
ETC developed from a group of concerned tenants who first
acknowledged that they had a right to control the development
of their community, then organized and demanded the right. This
is one of the basic laws of self-determination which Melvin
King, Massachusetts State Representative and South End resident,
often speaks of.
In 1965 the BRA, through flagrant neglect, created and
endorsed plans that would eradicate, through displacement, a
population of what they (the BRA) perceived as powerless people.
However, the tenacity of the people of Parcel 19 aided them in
grappling with their own self image, and subsequently led to
the building of a foundation of human power. It was this foun-
dation of power that forced the BRA to address the residents'
demands once ETC displayed to them their seriousness about
taking control of their own lives. "Under the motto, WE SHALL
NOT BE MOVED FROM PARCEL 19, residents negotiated an acceptable
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redevelopment program for their neighborhood and then proceeded
to incorporate in 1968 as a group capable of implementing the
program." 21 From the point of incorporation to the first
annual ETC meeting, the group gained recognition from the South
End residents and the greater Boston area through the mass
media. Other organizations and individuals acknowledging the
power and rights of Parcel 19 residents is what made the differ-
ence. As stated in the Introduction, the character of a neigh-
borhood is often determined by the character of the people which
inhabit it. The people of Parcel 19 changed their perceived
image, and changed the character of the are from powerless to
politically powerful. Once the BRA designated ETC as the
developer of Parcel 19 of the South End Urban Renewal Plan in
December, 1969, ETC had control of their destiny. In the words
of Melvin King, control of land is power, and ETC had control,
and therefore, power.
The ETC Board of Directors began implementing a strategy
developed with the assistance of an architect/planner from
Urban Planning Aid.22 The new team based their approach on
five prerequisites:
1. Maintenance of strong and unified neighborhood
organization capable of providing political
pressure when necessary.
2. Creation of a more extensive data base and a
better plan for Parcel 19 than that of the BRA's.
3. Development of an extensive information network
to inform residents to avoid giving the BRA the
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opportunity to negate plans on the grounds of
not informing all residents.
4. Maintenance of initiative during the negotiation
process with the BRA.
5. Involvement of an advocacy planner and resident
representative in all phases of the negotiation
process with the BRA.2 3
This strategy allowed ETC's representatives to argue from an
advantageous position during negotiations with the BRA and lead
to their phenomenal success during the following years. In
summation, it was people, political organization, and the use of
outside expertise which helped ETC to succeed. 2 4
Goals and Objectives
During the initial stages of development, ETC used the
following statement of corporate objective as a guide:
The Corporation is formed to combat poverty
and community deterioration through
charitable and educational programs aimed at:
- Promoting community participation in the
planning of housing development under the
South End Urban Renewal Plan.
- Preventing the disbursal of residents and
minimizing dislocation under the impact of
urban renewal.
- Generally improving the housing and living
conditions of community residents. 2 5
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Through the years, they have expanded to
include the following operational
objectives:
- Prevent the displacement of residents
(mainly low and moderate income) of Parcel 19,
now Villa Victoria.
- Develop family and elderly housing with low
rents and unit sizes compatible with the needs
of residents.
- Create an exciting neighborhood with quality
design work providing attractive and usable
open spaces and a sensible traffic pattern.
- Develop cultural activities to strengthen
the identity of the community.
- Provide services to insure the success of
the residents in the area living environment.
- Promote improvements in the economic stan-
dard of living of the residents of Villa
Victoria as well as overall economic activity
and commercial services.
- Develop a total neighborhood with residential,
institutional, and commercial activities.
- Guarantee long term community control over
the entire area.
- Mobilize public and private resources in the
area to build new community facilities (schoo 9,
clinics, etc.) to benefit existing residents.
It is clear from the broader objectives that cultural identity
and education became important elements to sustain ETC's
drive.27 Basically, the reinforcement of community values
served as a protection against those whowould come from an
external environment and do harm.
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Using the aforementioned goals and objectives as a guide,
Israel Feliciano, Luz Cuadrado, and Jorge Hernandez led ETC
into its successful developments. From 1971 to 1972 the Tremont/
Shawmut rehabilitation project was completed (seventy-one units).
Then, in 1973 the West Newton Street project was completed
(136 units). ETC Developers, Incorporated ( a for-profit
corporation that handles the bulk of housing development after
closing), ETC Development Council (the Board that initiates
development) and ETC Management Company, coordinated their
efforts and broadened their focus. In 1973, the name was
changed to what it is known by today - Inquilinos Boricuas en
Accion.
In 1974 Unity Tower/Plaza Betances (201 units) and IBA
headquarters building opened. During this same year the Areyto
cultural program and the Elderly Services component were
initiated.2 8
Even though the development of IBA appeared rapid it was
well controlled and planned growth. The IBA staff and Board of
Directors stayed away from "large quantities" of federal monies
in order to permit the organic growth of the organization.29
It was important to the long term survival of the organization
to develop its own indigenous talent and only rely on outside
talent for that expertise outside the community's capabilities
(i.e. legal, architectural, and planning).3 0
From 1974 to 1976 IBA focused its efforts on internal
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development and the construction of Viviendos La Victoria I
(181 units). 1977 saw the completion of Casa Boringuen (thirty-
six units) and Channel Six Communications program was initiated.
Like 1974, 1978 marked a large expansion in IBA's capacity and
function. The Security Patrol Program, Day Care Center, Crime
Prevention, and Commercial Development Program all were begun
in this year. This growth was met with enthusiasm and created
many jobs for community residents. The first business venture
was launched, and in 1980, Viviendas La Victoria II was started
(190 units). 31
IBA's overall budget is now $2,500,000 and has supported
all the aforementioned programs, and has succeeded in providing:
- Eighty per cent permanent jobs.
- "Payment of three forty-year mortgages with a value
of over $8,000,000.
- Payment of almost $200,000 in real estate taxes to
the City of Boston.
- Payment of utility bills, insurance, and other
items that benefit Boston's private sector.
- Hiring of several small contractors for special
jobs such as plumbing, electricity, some repairs." 3 2
During all phases of IBA's organizational development,
residents of Parcel 19 were involved in the planning and imple-
mentation. Because of this community involvement in these
processes the indigenous people became capable organizers,
planners and managers. Though outside expertise was used to
guide most of the legal and technical activities, the thrust of
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the effort came from the people of Parcel 19.
The close cultural ties of the Puerto Rican people, and
the ability of the diverse racial groups to accept differences
and work together had a substantial effect on the organization's
success. Establishing credibility within the Barrio (as Luz
Cuadrado calls it) environment, then externalizing that credi-
bility and using it to leverage political bodies in the
external environment is what made IBA so effective.
Organizational Structure, Staff Size,
and Corporate Relationships
The organizational structure of IBA has a great deal to
do with its responsiveness to community needs. As one can see
from the chart (Appendix Eight) the IBA Board of Directors
(elected at large by IBA members on a three year staggered
basis) is at the top of the decision making structure. All
programs are ultimately answerable to the Board, even if they
have a separate board for their individual program. In essence,
the IBA Board of Directors determines the speed and direction
of the organization.
First it should be noted that the IBA Board receives and
reviews proposals for new programs and project proposals, while
the day-to-day operation of the individual programs is left to
the program directors and their respective boards.
Second, if a decision for an individual project proposal
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is approved by any individual or entity affiliated with IBA it
is not ratified until it receives the Board's approval. Thus,
a project which may be perceived as good for IBA by a program
director may contradict the fundamental objectives of the agency
and could be rejected on those grounds.
Third, the Executive Director is empowered to oversee the
activities of IBA and its affiliates. The Executive Director
has the power to override decisions that he or she believes are
not in the best interest of IBA on the basis of social, politi-
cal, or economic reasons. Like most executive directorships,
this one carries a very profound filtering characteristic which,
if not monitored, could impair the ability of the agency to
address community needs. The discretion of the Executive
Director to discard those ideas which are perceived to not be
in IBA's best interests can be a formidable problem.
For instance, programs that may help the community grow in
terms of membership can be stopped befofe they reach the IBA
Board. Filtering of proposals can be as significant a strategy
to increase power as the approval power of the Board. If only
one person's approved proposals are presented to the Board only
one person's approved goals are being promoted. Fortunately,
IBA has had a succession of honest, strong leadership with a
deep commitment to its membership.
Finally, the composition of the IBA Board is confined to
twenty residents of IBA's redevelopment area. The membership
elects the Board members each summer and selected members serve
in staggered three year terms. This method of selection has
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kept the interest of the IBA community foremost in the
decisionmaking process and maintains the community control IBA
was built upon.3 3
IBA's parent board is "structured as a non-profit corpora-
tion with two affiliated corporations (one for-profit - ETC/DI,
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and one non-profit - ETC/DC). Both deal with housing
development.
The Parent board members are members of
ETC/DC (Development Corporation), a
private, non-profit corporation that
engages itself in the initial stages of
housing development activities through
seed money loans from church groups,
foundations, etc. The IBA Board, which
in turn appoints the board of ETC/DI
(Developers, Incorporated), a for-profit
corporation that handles the bulk of the
housing development effort (after initial
closing), serves as general partner of the
syndicated partnership that owns the
housing and acts as its management agent...
The board of ETC/DC and ETC/DI are com-
posed of a combination of neighborhood
residents, other South Enders, government
employees, technical professionals, and
other individuals whose presence facilitates
the direction of the work of the organization
in a manner consistent with neighborhood
priorities and government and private sector
interests. Participation of the board
members is very high since the board deals
with matters which affect residents on a
daily basis: rents, maintenance of housing,
security, day care, social services, 35
commercial services, new housing, etc.
As was previously mentioned, the Parent Board oversees the
Executive Director, who in turn, deals with program modifica-
tions and proposals on a daily basis. Though the Parent Board
makes decisions that effect the day to day functioning of IBA,
they do not make daily decisions. The Executive Director over-
sees the Assistant Director, Special Assistant, and Executive
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office. His or her decisions are often felt within a 'short
period of time.
The Assistant Director and Special Assistant to the
Director spend a large amount of time developing proposals and
obtaining funding for general operating and program development.
A network of information flow has been created between the
individual programs and the assistant directors. This infor-
mation flow includes data on current fund raising drives, types
of funds being sought (i.e. foundation, federal, city, corpor-
ations, bankers, lenders, state), specific agencies being
approached, the amount of money being requested and for what
purpose. Furthermore, these individuals occupy a critical role
in the lobbying of political clout for programs in the Congress
and Senate. The role of these individuals is vital to the
survival of the agency, so the Executive Director works closely
with these individuals.
Information and data flow between the Program Directors
and Staff is constant. Because of the constant interaction
revolving around the states of the financial condition of each
program, updates on possible program changes are exchanged.
This type of feedback loop is vital to keep the Executive
Director informed on the comprehensive picture.
Each program director guides his or her program in accord-
ance with the objectives laid out in its proposal. Reporting
requirements that are demanded by funders are the responsibility
of each individual program, but are usually sent through the
Executive and Assistant Directors for approval. This process
55
also occurs with proposals in order to keep quality consistent
and objectives alligned with those of IBA and the funding
agency.
Needless to say, the interrelationships and staff size
within programs are unique (see Appendix Eight) because each
program is designed to meet a specific need in the community.
The Commercial Development Component is no exception. It has a
staff of four persons: one Program Director, two staff workers,
and an intern. Since this paper focuses on the activities of
the Commercial Development Component, more detailed analysis of
its structure and capacity is presented in the following
chapter.
Objectives and Present Activities
In the eyes of many outsiders IBA is the optimal model
for comprehensive community development. IBA has surpassed the
expectations of many of its own members. Even though it has
been very successful it is still growing. Its organic nature
implies that the corpus is constantly developing. As a matter
of fact, this is true. IBA is now branching out into areas of
development which will make it a more stable and autonomous
entity.
For the last twelve years IBA has been provided vital
nutrients (i.e. land, labor, and capital) to establish a
foundation for its people. But now it is at the point where it
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must engage in activities which will provide its own resources
for the extensive support system it has created. The cultural/
education, day care, and other programs must begin to obtain
their support from internal sources, because the Regan admini-
stration and the generally conservative political mood of the
United States will not continue to support these services.
One direction IBA has begun to explore addresses the issue
of stability. The majority of the housing owned or managed by
IBA has subsidies that are effected by the income of the tenant.
For instance, if a tenant has a low income, that tenant pays
a low rent - usually a percentage of the income. Conversely,
if the tenant has a high income he or she pays a high rent.
Within the last few years IBA has lost some of its families
because of their rising income. Initially, the family benefited
from the subsidy because their income was small, but as their
job situation improved their income rose, and resulted in
their departure.
Some tenants leave to move to areas where rents are un-
subsidized, or in other words, where rents are determined by
the market. Others purchase homes. IBA is now investigating
a middle income cooperative housing development. Theoretically
the co-op housing will meet the needs of the families that
want to stay in the community even though their income has made
IBA subsidized housing prohibitive in terms of cost. This
model is supposed to create a more stable environment and cut
down on the turnover in the community.
Another area which IBA is investigating which concerns the
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development of control of economic resources. IBA contains
a large low and moderate income population. Nevertheless, these
individuals have banking needs. As of April 1, 1981, IBA
opened the first Hispanic run financial institution in the State
of Massachusetts and probably New England - The Credit Union.
Its membership are able to deposit capital, draft on their
deposits, earn an interest yield and borrow money for purchases.
The actual lending and drafting have not yet been fully opera-
tionalized, but they will be before the end of 1981. Addressing
the banking needs of the community is IBA's first step toward
control of economic resources.
Additionally, IBA's Commercial Development Component is
refining the administrative and management plan for a Revolving
Loan and Equity Fund (RLF) for small business development. The
RLF should be fully capitalized at a minimum of $65,000 or a
maximum of $100,000 by the end of May. The design and function
of this RLF is the focus of this thesis.
First, IBA's ability to deal with the problems of financing
small business development with capitalization is addressed.
Second, an appropriate strategy is discus.sed, given the con-
straints IBA has. Finally, recommendations for future plans
are made which IBA should consider.
The author of this thesis argues that the perception of
the financing community of low and moderate income communities
has tremendous impact on its amount of lending activities.
This is particularly true of small business. Moreover, race
also enters the equation. Although it is not quantifiably
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detectable, it is manifested in the disproportionate amount of
lending denials. The fact that the minority small business
community has not developed a strategy for rectifying this
condition is not strange.
Unlike IBA, the minority small business entrepreneur is
involved in a personal endeavor. That is to say, his profits
from a loan will benefit him. There is no federal policy
that states that all minority small business entrepreneurs,
marginal or not, are entitled to receive money from banks or
lending institutions.
Therefore, in order for the minority small business
entrepreneur to change the perception-of the banking community,
he or she needs to be given a chance to prove the viability of
the chosen business. IBA's RLF can work as a mechanism to
help minority small businesses gain bank credibility and
eventually seek lending on their own. Before delving any
further into this matter it is necessary to discuss the
Commercial Development Component of IBA in greater detail.
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COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT COMPONENT OF IBA
Over the last twelve years IBA has built an outstanding
reputation in the area of community controlled housing develop-
ment and social service delivery. It was not until 1976 that
IBA began to take serious steps to actively participate in the
economic development of the South End. As in previous develop-
ment ventures, IBA members knew that developing well defined,
logical goals and objectives based on substantiated data was the
best method for entering an area in which they had little or no
expertise.
To this end, the IBA Board of Directors retained the
services of BFH Associates of Cambridge, Massachusetts to perform
a market study in the primary impact area described in Chapter
1
Two. This market study served as a guide for the IBA Board to
develop an economic development strategy. The policy guidance
of the Board and the approval of the majority of the IBA member-
ship has helped IBA maintain its community control, and has
contributed to its recent success in the area of commercial
development.
The purpose of this chapter is fourfold: first, to
define IBA's economic development strategy; second, to present
IBA's Commercial Component accomplishments, goals and objectives;
third, to describe the commercial development staff organization;
and, fourth, to indicate the manner in which the various
activities interrelate. In the final part of this chapter the
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manner in which the RLF relates to the other development
activities is discussed.
IBA's Economic Development Strategy
The study by BFH Associates revealed numerous facts about
the South End market and its population's shopping characteris-
tics. From IBA's perspective, one of BFH Associates most
significant findings was that several businesses could be
successful "in a Villa Victoria location" and that "a small
Hispanic-oriented shopping center could be successfully located
in Plaza Betances." 2
To capitalize on the market conditions of the South End
and to provide jobs for Villa Victoria residents, "IBA/ETC
revised and expanded its neighborhood revitalization strategy to
include the following business development/job creation strategy:
1. Create jobs (through initial charitable funds)
for community residents in organizing and social
work activities that would help the organization
implement its long range development plan.
2. Create temporary jobs through housing construct-
ion (to date, over 1,000 jobs).
3. Create permanent jobs through the need to
service the housing (management, commerce,
social services, maintenance, security). This
has resulted in the establishment of IBA and its
64
various subsidiaries, and in the creation of
125 permanent jobs.
4. Generate unrestricted funds from the housing
development activity to invest in business
ventures that will:
a. create jobs and income for community
residents;
b. provide goods and services for
community residents;
c. expand IBA's expertise in economic
development;
d. strengthen the economic base of Villa
Victoria and the South End; and
e. serve as sources of income for future
investment.
5. Generate additional unrestricted funds from
these initial business investments that can be
used to make equity investments in larger-scale
retail and manufacturing projects that will:
a. generate additional income;
b. further expand IBA's economic develop-
ment; and
c. provide many more jobs for South End
residents.
6. Use the income generated by previous investments
to start up and operate large-scale manufactur-
ing concerns so as to create a large number of
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jobs and further strengthen the economic base of
the South End.3
As one can see, the intended strategy is to build on an
existing expertise in housing and social service delivery (Steps
One through Three) and expand into business ventures by using
unrestricted funds from housing development activity (Step Four).
Inasmuch as steps one through three were already common experi-
ence, Step Four did seem like the next logical step. The income
generated by the initial business venture would then be recycled
to form equity investments for larger-scaled projects (Step Five)
in retail or manufacturing.
The transition from Step Four to Step Five is a difficult
one because it contains crucial milestones. One milestone would
be the identification of a successful small business venture to
invest in. Another would be the generation of enough profit
from this'small venture to form an equity investment of a larger
retail venture. Formation of capital for investment is difficult
for many profit-making organizations, so it is safe to assume
that it would be even more difficult for a profit agency with a
non-profit parent. The level of managerial expertise for such
an operation would have to be developed within the agency over
time or from an outside source at great cost.
Step Six would be worthwhile to take if Step Five is
successful. However, if it is not successful, Step Six cannot
take place. To date, IBA is grappling with Step Four.
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Commercial Development Accomplishments,
Goals and Objectives
After the overall strategy was developed, the IBA Board of
Directors and Staff members developed a general proposal which
would provide the basic level of commercial goods and services
for the Villa Victoria residents. Moreover, this plan included
an entrepreneur identification and training program with an
emphasis on assisting entrepreneurs to secure financing for their
ventures.
The proposal for funding was accepted in 1977 by the Office
of Neighborhood Development (OND), the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), and IBA hired a four member staff in 1978
which researched several prospective businesses in detail,
determined the proper store mix, identified spacial needs,
identified potential sources of financing for business develop-
ment, began preliminary discussion with interested entrepreneurs,
worked with the Boston Private Industry Council to set up
training programs, and generally planned the development of the
shopping center. 6 Staff of the Commercial Development Component
also submitted, within a year, a proposal to the Economic
Development Administration for a $546,455 grant to develop
17,000 square feet of additional commercial space "along the
only remaining undeveloped side of Plaza Betances", identified
alternative facilities for the social service programs which
were located in the existing 8,000 square feet of commercial
space, and set up IBA's first commercial venture - a laundrymat
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which met the needs of the community, as well as the entrepre-
7
neur.
Other accomplishments of the Commercial Development staff
that came within the second year were as follows:
1. Negotiated the purchase of nearby church facility,
developed plans and initiated a fundraising .
campaign for its rehabilitation so that it could
be used to relocate several service programs.
2. Expanded the size and capability of IBA's secur-
ity force so as to provide a safe residential
and business environment.
3. Began planning the expansion of IBA's closed-
circuit television station into a city-wide
Spanish language cable franchise.
4. Began organizing a credit union to provide
needed banking services for residents of the
area.
5. Began working with existing South End businesses
to organize a merchants association.
6. Began working with the American Institute of
Architects' Regional/Urban Design Assistance
Team to develop a comprehensive strategy for
upgrading and developing the South End's commer-
cial corridors.
7. Began working with two minority entrepreneurs
who planned to establish an electronic component
parts manufacturing business that could employ
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as many as seventy formerly unemployed South
End residents.
8. Secured a $20,000 grant from the Massachusetts
Executive Office of Communities and Development
and initiated a fundraising campaign to raise an
additional $45,000 to $80,000 for the establish-
ment of a $65,000 to $100,000 Revolving Loan and
Equity Fund (RLF). 8
By the middle of 1980, two years after initial funding by
HUD, the Commercial Development Component had established a good
track record. To date, May, 1981, the Component has already
opened the first Hispanic financial institution in New England -
The South End Credit Union. It has also established a technical
assistance linkage with the Small Business Development Corpor-
ation, developed designs and store mix for the new commercial
space under construction along the eastern border of Plaza Be-
tances, initiated the relocation efforts for social service
agencies in existing commercial space, created plans for business
promotion, and obtained $55,000 of the needed $65,000 to capital-
ize the RLF.
The staff's pragmatic approach to the needs of the
community has contributed to the success of the Commercial
Development Component. Furthermore, the support of the commun-
ity, the IBA Board of Directors, and Director Jorge Hernandez
have augmented the effectiveness of staff members. Finally, the
planning of the activities in an interrelated fashion has kept
the tasks of the Commercial Development staff comprehensive.
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The goals of the Commercial Development Component are
synonymous with those of IBA's economic development strategy.
However, the objectives are as follows:
1. To expand the services of the Credit Union to
include personal and commercial lending, savings
certificates, check cashing, and other functions.
2. To complete plans for the new commercial space
and relocate local entrepreneurs into that space.
3. To negotiate lease agreements to include all
fees necessary to sustain and secure commercial
space once it is operationalized.
4. To complete capitalization of the RLF and to
have the design and management plan ratified by
the IBA Board of Directors, and to operationalize
the RLF.
5. To raise funds to rehabilitate the All Saints
Church for the purpose of housing the social
service agencies occupying existing commercial
space.
6. To relocate users of commercial space to new
space.
7. To finalize business promotion plans for the
9
Plaza Betances shopping area.
These objectives are leading to the goals implicitly
stated in Step Five of the economic development strategy, which
is to generate unrestricted income to invest in business ven-
tures. Unrestricted income may be obtained from the percentage
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of sales which IBA will receive from the businesses utilizing
the Plaza Betances commercial space.
Commercial Development Staff Organization
IBA's Commercial Development Component is just one of the
many programs described in Chapter Three (refer to the Organiza-
tion Chart Appendix Eight ). The Commercial Development Com-
ponent is organized in the following manner:
BOARD OF DIRECTORS1
Other
Program
Directors
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
Project Director
Secretary
Assistant Director
Of Business Development
Director
Of
'Housing
Development
Assistant
For
Development
Assistant For
On Site
Assistance
Volunteer Graduate
Student-Intern
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"The business development staff reports to the Project
Director on general matters and to the Business Development
Assistant Director for technical matters. Close coordination
exists between the Project Director, his assistant, and other
program directors. Project staff report to the agency's
Assistant Director on personnel and internal administrative
matters and to the Executive Director on project directions and
external resources. Work on implementing IBA's economic develop-
ment plans has been assigned as follows:
1. Luis Ramos, Business Development Director
a. project administration, staff supervision
from an organizational and scheduling point
of view.
b. coordination of activities with existing
business people.
c. organization of an advisory committee to
oversee RLF program activities.
d. selection of potential tenants for the new
shopping center (responsible for organiza-
tional, public relations and selection
aspects as well as resource location).
e. coordination of church rehabilitation
project."1
2. Hector Melendez, Assistant for On Site Assistance
a. organization of business planning sessions
for local entrepreneurs.
b. ongoing assistance to La Plaza Laundrymat.
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c. on site assistance to new and existing
businesses, especially those locating in
the new shopping center.
d. improvement of security capability.
e. RLF management.
3. Peter Candelero, Assistant for Development
a. organization and operation of credit union.
b. performance of financial analyses.
c. assisting Luis Ramos, Business Development
Director with the development of guidelines
for businesses desiring to locate in the
new shopping center.
4. Victorio Hoskins, Volunteer Graduate Student
Intern
a. completion of capitalization of the RLF
through follow-up and updating outstanding
corporations and foundations, and meetings
with prospective donors.
b. creation of RLF program design and manage-
ment plan.
c. finalization of reporting and contractual
requirements with the Office of Communities
and Development.
5. "Jorge Hernandez, Executive Director
a. overall supervision.
b. relation with Board of Directors and the
government.
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c. new initiatives.
d. ongoing evaluation.
6. Talo Odria, Assistant Director
a. personnel.
b. internal management.
c. support of Jorge Hernandez, Executive
Director, in the Board of Directors and
government relations, and overall super-
vision.
d. troubleshooting.
7. Nydia Cepeda, Secretary
a. performance of secretarial duties."1 2
Interrelationships of Activities
Each person in the Commercial Development Component
occupies a vital position because all the projects are inter-
dependent. To illustrate this interdependency, one need only
remove one of the projects. For example, if there was no All
Saints Church Project the Business Promotion and Assistance
Program would have to be reduced and deal with fewer busi-
nesses, to identify alternative space for social service agen-
cies in present commercial space, or to find funds to construct
new commercial space for prospective tenants.
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The Revolving Loan Equity Fund:
Its Relationship to Other Development Activities
The RLF has a direct relationship to the Business
Promotion and Assistance Project because it will be providing
some capital to entrepreneurs to meet their financing needs.
Because of its role in this Project, the RLF also relates to the
All Saints Church indirectly.
Like the Credit Union, the RLF is designed to meet the
financing needs of the community. The Credit Union will focus
primarily on personal financing needs and the RLF will focus on
business financing needs. Nevertheless, the Credit Union and
the RLF will work together in participation loans to assist
larger business financing projects.
The RLF will be managed by the RLF management team and
its relationship to the Board of Directors and government
agencies will be handled by the Executive Director and the
Assistant Director through their defined tasks. Finally, the
overall coordination of the RLF will be deligated by the
Business Development Director (See Appendix Eight for more detail-
ed information).
Conclusion
Even though the commercial:development activities at
IBA began in 1978, only three years ago, it has achieved a
considerable amount of success. The accomplishments have added
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to its credibility and augmented the skills of its staff.
Activities of the Commercial Development Component are now
focusing on Step Five of the economic development strategy of
IBA, and are relating to one another in an interdependent manner
to produce a comprehensive strategy. Because of the importance
of the Commercial Development Component's projects, every effort
is made to make the project plans materialize. In the next
chapter the methodology of making the RLF materialize is dis-
cussed, and the design and management plan presented.
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Chapter Four
REVOLVING LOAN AND EQUITY FUND
FOR
INQUILINOS BORICUAS EN ACCION
Chapter One discusses the major problems confronting the
minority small businesses of the South End. Once the problems
are defined, Chapter Two provides an overview of IBA, an agency
interested in minority small business development in the South
End. By describing the elements of the strategy which IBA uses
to effect the external political capital placement process, a
framework for successful implementation of a market perfecting
mechanism such as an RLF is then laid out. Chapter Three
describes the previous business development efforts of IBA and
the persons that will be involved in the RLF implementation
process. This chapter focuses on the appropriate design and
management plan for IBA's RLF in light of the community's needs
and the agency's goals.
Definition
"A Revolving Loan Fund is a pool of money used by..." a
community development organization or other non-profit agency
"...for the purpose of making loan guarantees. As loans are
repaid by borrowers, the money is returned to the Fund to make
other loans. In that manner, the Fund becomes an ongoing or
revolving financial tool."
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This definition summarizes the manner in which most
RLF's operate, with one important exception - RLF's vary in the
way they finance ventures. Briefly, some of the most common
uses of RLF capital is to provide direct loans, loan guarantees,
loan insurance, and subordinated debt. There are even those
which provide equity. The RLF IBA proposes to establish will
provide three types of financing: loan guarantees, direct loans,
and equity investments. Thus, it is called a Revolving Loan
and Equity Fund ( please note that an interest subsidy will be
given in special cases). For the purpose of simplicity, this
thesis refers to it as an RLF.
Even though the financing of RLF's differ their program
designs are very similar. There are usually six basic
components:
1. Community Outreach.
2. Assessment of Lendees Elegibility and Financial
Capabilities.
3. Selection and Approval Process.
4. Monitoring of Outstanding Loans.
5. Fund Management.
6. Program Evaluation.
The RLF's purpose usually determines whether or not it has more
or less of these components. For instance, if the need for
technical assistance in the community is great, there may be a
Technical Assistance component.
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Background
Throughout the last five years, RLF's have been used in
Boston for various purposes such as business development or
housing repair. Specifically, the East Boston Community
Development Corporation (EBCDC) has successfully utilized its
$250,000 RLF guarantee program to meet the financing needs of
its community's small businesses. It has done significant
leveraging, but has not provided direct financing. From
January, 1976 to February, 1979, on a $250,000 grant from the
Community Services Administration, the Revolving Loan Guarantee
Fund (RLGF) program of East Boston served twenty local entre-
preneurs with loan guarantees totalling $276,650, and bank
financing amounting to $611,300; total financing, including the
2
investment of principal, amounted to $979,700. To date, the
RLGF has financed over thirty-five ventures and leveraged
$3.54 in banking dollars to every $1.00 of RLGF dollars. 3
The businesses that received financing through EBCDC/RLGF
were refused conventional financing before obtaining a loan
guarantee. Banks are willing to provide financing for these
small businesses with greater information and reduced exposure
which it obtains from the RLGF program. With an annual default
rate of only three per cent the RLGF can be considered a viable
market perfecting instrument for community development.4
Another successful RLF is run by the Neighborhood Housing
Service (NHS) of Jamaica Plain.5 NHS's focus is on housing
repair and the level of capitalization is below $50,000.6 It
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provides direct short term loans for housing repair which are
revolved in the same manner as all other RLF's.
During the fall of 1980 in Dorchester the Massachusetts
Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group's Community Reinvestment
Revolving Loan Fund (CRRLF) was capitalized by the Economic
Development Administration, the State Street Bank, and New
England Merchants National Bank of Boston, at $1,500,000. This
fund is targeted at central business districts throughout the
neighborhood. Unlike the EBCDC/RLGF, the CRRLF will provide
reduced interest loans, direct loans, subordinated debt, and
loan insurance for small businesses.8 In addition, the Massa-
chusetts Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group (MTCRAG) will continue
reducing the bank's information and transaction cost through
its program. The potential for the CRRLF to act as an effective
tool for community development is great.
All of the above examples use various approaches to
achieve the same goal. EBCDC and MURAG both emphasis guarantees
and leveraging, while NHS stresses direct lending. In any case,
they are all attempting to cope with capital market failure by
either directly filling the financial gaps or indirectly
influencing the lending policy of banking institutions. The
following section describes the design and management plan of
IBA's RLF and how it will respond to the financing and operating
needs of its small business community.
81
Goals And Objectives
Primarily, the purpose of the RLF is to do the following:
1. Improve the economic viability of existing
small businesses by providing organizational,
operational, financial, and managerial assist-
ance (directly or indirectly) to lower costs and
raise profits.
2. Provide the minority businesses of the South End
with the appropriate capital to facilitate
growth and development.
3. Create and expand businesses to generate new
jobs for unemployed members of the community.9
4. Increase community residents' control of
neighborhood land, labor, and capital re-
10
sources.
5. Deliver needed services to community residents.
6. Select potential entrepreneurs from the local
community that may be capable of operating a
new business venture.
Capitalization
IBA decided to capitalize its RLF through a challenge
grant from the State of Massachusetts' Community Enterprise
and Economic Development Office (CEED), and donations from
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corporations and foundations. This allowed for flexibility in
the RLF use guidelines because state grants and philanthropic
donations do not have the restrictive requirements of federal
organizations like the Community Services Administration.
As of April 31, 1981, the following organizations have
committed funds to the RLF:
Organization
CEED (challenge grant)
Charlestown Savings
Cornerstone Charitable Trust
(New England Merchants National Bank)
ETC, Inc.
Honeywell
Mac-Gray
New England Nuclear
Suffolk Bank
Vingo Trust II
Warren Charitable Trust (Shawmut Bank)
T O T A L
Amount
$ 20,000
1,000
10,000
10,000
1,000
1,000
100
2,000
5,000
5,000
$ 55,100
The total amount necessary to meet the CEED challenge grant
requirement is $9,900. This will make the RLF a minimum of
$65,000. It's maximum projected size is $100,000. Other
foundations and corporations are being approached for the
remaining portion.
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Guidelines*
The guidelines for administering the Revolving Loan and
Equity Fund are as follows:
I. Eligible Uses
A. The following activities will be eligible to
receive financial assistance from the Fund:
1. Land and/or building acquisition for
industrial or commercial uses, if it results
in creating or saving jobs.
2. Construction or renovation of buildings for
industrial or commercial business, if it
results in creating or saving jobs.
3. Purchase of machinery, equipment and fix-
tures by industrial or commercial business,
if it results in creating or saving jobs.
4. Working capital financing, but generally
only when the loan can be secured by inven-
tory or accounts receivable.
B. The Revolving Loan and Equity Fund program funds
can be used in the following ways:
1. To guarantee bank loans for an amount not to
exceed the Fund's share of the total loan.
2. To subsidize the interest on bank loans.
3. To make direct loans to businesses.
* These guidelines were developed by the Commercial Developmnent
staff and the IBA Business Advisory Board.
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However, to the extent possible, any long
term direct loans will be limited to local
development corporation injections, since
this allows for maximum leveraging. (IBA
has been in contact with United South End/
Lower Roxbury Development Corporation, which
is planning to establish a South End-wide
local development corporation, about how to
coordinate our efforts.) In circumstances
in which IBA is unable to make use of a
local development corporation, our direct
loans will generally be limited to short
term, working capital-type loans, especially
when such loans serve to induce a bank to
provide longer term financing for the busi-
ness. Direct loans will be used to leverage
as much of the total loan amount as possible.
Entrepreneurs must be willing to contribute
at least ten per cent and banks sixty-five
per cent.
4. To purchase stock in a corporation so as to
improve its equity position and thereby
qualify it for conventional financing.
(This will generally only be done when our
equity option is below fifty per cent of
the common stock and when the number of high
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quality, permanent jobs created or retained
justifies the investment.)
IIL. Beneficiaries
A. The program's beneficiaries will be limited to
socially and economically disadvantaged entre-
preneurs who want to expand or upgrade an
existing business or to establish a new busi-
ness. Preference will be given to South End
businesses, particularly those locating in the
proposed Villa Victoria Shopping Center and
those in the immediate vicinity. Non-South End
businesses will be considered only in the event
that they will provide a significant number of
high quality, permanent jobs to South End resi-
dents. Since IBA will be attempting to leverage
Massachusetts.Community Development Finance
Corporation funds or other private financing,
IBA will use $5,000 of program funds per job
created/saved as a rule-of-thumb in determining
our prospective involvement.
III. Criteria
A. Because of the relatively small size of the
Fund, participants in the program will have to
show proof that acceptable financing is not
available from other sources, or that Fund
involvement is needed to be able to successfully
use conventional sources.
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B. Entrepreneurs will be asked to submit a
business plan. The business development staff-
and. its advisory board must determine that the
business is economically viable. Entrepreneurs
must then agree to conform to special conditions
of the Business Plan and its revisions while the
loan is outstanding.
C. The entrepreneur must demonstrate that he/she
has had prior experience in the type of busi-
ness requesting financing, or has had related
experience.
D. The principals must demonstate that they do not
have an unsatisfactory credit record.
E. Applicants may be required to personally
guarantee loans made by or through the Fund.
F. All applicants must be majority owners of the
business for which the application is submitted
and must reveal all minority ownership positions
before receiving funding.
G. All financial assistance must be exclusively
for business purposes.
Program Components
To meet the goals and objectives of the RLF, IBA should
include the following program components in its RLF:
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1. Community outreach to local entrepreneurs
and potential lending institutions.
2. Assessment of entrepreneur's skills.
3. Technical assistance (direct or indirect).
4. Selection and approval process for loan
guarantees, direct loans, and equity investments.
5. Monitoring of outstanding loans and investments.
6. Fund management.
7. Program evaluation.
On the following page is a diagram of RLF program
components.
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Each of these components is necessary for IBA's RLF to
succeed in improving the capital placement problem in the South
End. Below the function of each component is outlined along
with the rationale for its existence in the RLF program design.
(Note that a full time loan officer/manager and a part time
accountant will compose the staff of the RLF).
Community Outreach
To Local Entrepreneurs And Lenders
First, the purpose and function of the RLF should be
communicated to the local minority businesses before lending
ensues. A program of community outreach which would iniclude
a marketing brochure in both English and Spanish, information
sessions, and on site visits should be executed in the two to
three weeks before operations or processing of loans begins.
This type of marketing campaign is necessary to avoid resis-
tance from the entrepreneurs and to find out if they feel that
the established procedures are acceptable. Many potential
lendees may view, for example, the proposed auditing process
every three months as too frequent. Additionally, the dissem-
ination of accurate information may prevent non-eligible persons
from applying, thereby reducing unnecessary workload.
Second, as far as IBA is concerned, it is important to
create a cooperative (not competitive) atmosphere between
itself and the local business community. There are some local
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businesses that view IBA's commercial development activities
as competition to their businesses. IBA should make every
effort to work with local businesses and to clarify its purpose
in commercial development to insure credibility and avoid
conflict.
Finally, the purpose and function of the RLF should be
communicated to bankers, lenders, government and non-profit
agencies which effect the South End business community.
Agencies such as the BRA, the Massachusetts Community Develop-
ment Finance Agency, Boston Neighborhood Development Agencies,
the Small Business Administration, and others, should be in-
formed of the purpose and function of the RLF through a letter
and other secondary information (i.e. brochure). Informing
these agencies will facilitate coordination and improve the
possibility of leveraging capital through the use of existing
programs.
Bankers and lenders should be contacted by letter and
through personal presentations. An in-person presentation is
necessary to begin establishing a personal relationship with
local lenders. Developing a rapport and a level of trust with
the banking community is extremely important to the loan guar-
antee portion of the program. The idea must be "sold" to
banks in order to get them to partipate. Therefore, a concise,
effective, professional presentation of the RLF should prove
invaluable. Since the loan guarantee portion will be more
than likely the largest portion of the loan portfolio because
of its lower risk to the RLF, this step is crucial.
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The materials and presentation on the RLF should:
1. Introduce the purpose, goals, and function.
2. Articulate the guidelines and limitations.
3. Define the approval process.
As time progresses and loans are guaranteed and lent out,
photographs of assisted businesses could be put in local papers
to attract more participants and add to the credibility of the
fund.
Assessment Of The Entrepreneur's Skills
Business skill assessment of entrepreneurs is necessary
for identifying problems of specific business persons. It may
be discovered, for instance, that poor coordination of purchas-
ing may be repeatedly causing cash flow problems of a business.
This purchase coordination problem may reveal that the entre-
preneur does not prioritize purchases or fails to plan
adequately. Identifying these problems before the selection
and approval process can save a tremendous amount of time.
Those entrepreneurs needing technical assistance will be
assisted directly or referred to another agency for more
extensive assistance.
Technical Assistance
Direct technical assistance (TA) and TA linkages should
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be provided through the RLF via the staff, particularly the
loan officer/manager. During the process of outreach and
entrepreneur skills assessment the loan officer/manager should
be able to identify the most severe problems confronting the
minority small business. If the loan officer/manager discovers
that none of the business persons have experience in business
planning he or she could then contact an agency like the Small
Business Development Corporation (SBDC). The SBDC provides
training in business planning. Additionally, they offer TA in
other facets of small business development.
On the other hand, if the problems the minority small
business persons have are minor, like completing application
forms or identifying a supplier, the loan officer/manager should
provide direct assistance. The accountant could serve as an
educator in the area of bookkeeping. It would not be appropri-
ate to have the accountant set up the books of all small
businesses in the South End. However, he or she should be able
to offer advice on general record keeping problems.
Advice on upgrading the facades of businesses and the
importance of interior maintenance should be provided by the
loan officer/manager. Since appearance and product line are
identified as two of the major deterrents to local shoppers, it
would be wise to identify a contractor or group of contractors
that could help minority small businesses improve the exterior
and interior appearance. Moreover, if the businesses could be
organized so that abutters would all share the cost of con-
structing a new facade, this could reduce the overall cost to
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every participant. The loan officer/manager should encourage
cooperation and cost sharing among minority small businesses.
A security service could even be provided through a share cost
arrangement. Because IBA has a security patrol already,
perhaps this service could be purchased from it.
The product lines of minority small businesses should
begin to shift to the new market if they are going to survive
and raise profitability. Suggestions on the types of products
the new market is demanding should be given by the loan officer/
manager.
Selection And Approval Process
First, the most unacceptable, risky, and non-eligible loans
should be "weeded out" early. This is necessary toreduce the
amount of unnecessary work. A credit check through the local
credit bureau or TRW, the national credit agency, would reveal
those individuals with horrendously poor credit histories.
Checking will not reveal all candidates, because some candidates
may not yet have a credit history. Nonetheless, it will serve
to catch those that do have unacceptable credit histories. A
record ofall rejections should be kept in the files and
presented to the Business Advisory Board during regular
meetings. This will allow the Board the opportunity to re-
consider a candidate if they feel some potential is evident or
special circumstance should be considered.
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Second, after the "weeding" process is complete and the
potential lendee has completed the application and business
plan these materials should be forwarded to the Business Advi-
sory Board for evaluation, along with the loan officer/manager
recommendations. Sufficient time for review should be allowed
before the meeting of the Board, loan officer/manager, and the
lendee. Since there will be three types of investments:
guarantee, direct loans, and equity investments, three types of
criteria should be used. Because of the risk and the potential
for losses, an equity investment should have the greatest return
in terms of jobs, dollars, or service to the community. Direct
loans should have the second greatest return in terms of jobs
and service to the community, while guarantee loans have the
least in all categories. The rule should be that "The amount
of risk justifies returns." (see Appendix Eleven for cost-
benefit analyses of each type of financing). With these costs
and benefits in mind, the financing terms and business plans
should be examined.
For those candidates applying for any form of RLF
financing, the process of evaluation must be thorough, because
the credibility of the IBA RLF will be at stake. Reduction of
transaction and information cost, risk aversity, and prejudice
can only be achieved through a success rate which is perceived
by banks as reasonable. The collection and evaluation of
accurate personal and business background information is key
to the success of. the RLF. These responsibilities fall on the
loan officer/manager and the Business Advisory Board.
95
As was previously mentioned, the entrepreneur will be
evaluated by the loan officer/manager who will then make a
recommendation to the Business Advisory Board. The evaluation
of the entrepreneur and the business plan will be done by the
Board. Additionally, in the case of a direct loan or equity
investment, the Board should review the terms requested by the
candidate and those recommended by the loan officer/manager.
If the recommendations of the loan officer/manager are consis-
tent with the request of the entrepreneur, then the Board will
compare them to their own. If the Board recommends considerab-
ly different terms, a process of negotiation should take place.
Hopefully, some agreement can be reached between the three
parties.
Third, upon completion of the evaluation by the Board,
the entrepreneur will be either rejected or sent to the IBA
Board for approval, along with recommendations from the
Business Advisory Board. The role of the IBA Board should be
to insure that appropriate processes were utilized by the
Business Advisory Board, criteria and guidelines were followed,
and the best interests of the IBA community are being served.
Only upon approval by the IBA Board will any type of financing
be provided.
In the case of a loan guarantee, once the IBA Board
approval has been obtained, the negotiation process for final
financing terms should take place with the lender. During the
negotiation process with the banker or lender, the loan
officer/manager should be present, along with the lender and
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and the lendee. The loan officer manager should be an
advocate for the entrepreneur. The loan officer should assist
the lendee with case presentation, and should clarify the
position the RLF will take in the financing package. Any
question concerning supporting documentation should be answered
by the lendee or the loan officer/manager. The most favorable
terms for the lendee and the RLF should be what the loan
officer/manager strives for. Then, after terms are agreed
upon between the RLF, the bank, and the lendee, the IBA Board
should have the opportunity to review the final terms. If this
review is positive, a contract should be signed between the
RLF, the bank or lender, and the lendee. This contract does
not replace the contract that should be signed between the
lender and the lendee. The legal counselors of IBA should
assist in the contractual preparation for guarantee, direct
loan, and equity investment. (Note the Selection And Approval
Process diagram on the following page).
Monitoring Of Outstanding Loans
Outstanding loans should be monitored formally and
informally. A simple telephone call to the lender once a
month is important to make sure that a guarantee recipient is
not delinquent with payments. A site visit to the business
itself should also prove useful to see how work is progressing.
In the case of direct loans, monitoring of the businesses'
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monthly progress could mean the difference between a solvent
loan and a defaulted one.
Fund Management
First, IBA's RLF monies should be held in a commercial bank
yielding the highest interest possible with the least amount of
risk. During the first two months of operation, a large per-
centage of the capitalized amount could be locked into a high
interest bearing account like a certificate of deposit, a three
month treasury bill, or a money market certificate. The per-
centage recommended to be put in such an account is eighty
percent: for the first three months. Because the first loans
will take a considerable amount of time to process, only one of
two loans will probably be disbursed by the end of the first
three months. Therefore, it is not necessary to have all the
capital in a ready asset account at a bank.
Second, during the third and fourth month, as processing of
loans becomes more expedicious as a result of streamlining of
the process, more money should be placed in shorter term accounts
so that it can be lent out.
Third, it is safe to assume that the ceiling on loans should
be around $10,000. Because of the RLF's size, only a few busi-
nesses should receive this amount. The loan guarantee
should be no greater than twenty percent. Most loan guarantees
should be around $5,000 and should leverage roughly $20,000
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from private lenders. These projections are based on
conversations with other RLF managers and research on lending
policy. Of course, these projections can be effected by the
capitalization level. The terms of the loans, whether direct
or guarantee, should be around six months to three years.
Fourth, interest earnings from guarantees should be
reinvested in the RLF to maintain its level of capitalization.
During the sixth month of lending an effort to seek other
monies to capitalize the fund should be made. These monies
could be obtained by pointing out the success of the fund in
previous cases.
Fifth, default policy should be established by the
Business Advisory Board, and approved by the IBA Board of
Directors. However, it is recommended that an option
preventing default be included in the legal agreement between
the bank or lender, the RLF, and the lendee.
Program Evaluation
The performance and outcome measures of a program can
reveal the success or failure of design features or methodology.
Some of the process and outcome measures that are relevant to
IBA's RLF are listed below:
1. Process Measures
a. The number of existing entrepreneurs assisted by
the RLF.
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b. The number of new entrepreneurs assisted by
the RLF.
c. The number of potential entrepreneurs identified
and assisted by the RLF.
d. The number of loan guarantees, direct loans, and
equity investments administered by the RLF.
2. Outcome Measures
a. The number of jobs generated by RLF-assisted
businesses.
b. The number of existing and new businesses
improved by the RLF.
c. The number of businesses provided with capital
that facilitated growth and development.
d. The number of failed businesses assisted by the
RLF.
e. The number of previously unemployed persons now
employed as a result of the RLF.
f. The number of defaulted loans.
Implementation Strategy
IBA has been successful in its housing, educational and
human service development programs for numerous reasons.
Nevertheless, there are four which stand out:
- Community control over the decision making process.
- Excellent organizational leadership and planning.
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- Reinforcement of a strong cultural identity.
- Effective organization around immediate community
needs.
All four of these factors have been central to the
successful development strategy of IBA. Each step has been
well planned and executed with the community's approval and the
leadership's direction. A strong cultural pride has been
evident throughout the entire process.
The issues at hand, in IBA's early stages of development,
were how to deal with housing and providing services for
residents. Now the emphasis is shifting to the creation of
employment for unemployed workers and obtaining necessary
commercial and retail services simultaneously. The former
problems involved IBA deeply in the local governmental political
process, but the latter entails becoming involved in the
financial institutional political process. Instead of modifying
government policy, IBA will be attempting to change private
lending policies.
While struggling to change governmental policy IBA used
direct action and community mobilization tactics (i.e. sit-ins,
demonstrations) to effect the political process. Then through
an educational process IBA began using sophisticated data base
and plans to convince the government of its ability to plan and
develop its own community.
Today, in the struggle to change private lending policy,
IBA has chosen not to use the direct action tactics of previous
years. Instead it is relying upon the community to support the
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businesses that it finances. Having the support of the
community includes giving the community the businesses it
believes provide a vital service and are consistant with the
cultural identity.
Moreover, as with the government, to effect lending
policy, the sophisticated data base and plans are necessary.
The organizational leadership and planning is vital to exemplify
to bankers and lenders that IBA has a commercial development
program which is capable of identifying profitable ventures and
constructively planning for the future of its community.
As far as community control over the activities of the
Commercial Development Component, there is a substantial amount.
The control comes in the form of the IBA Board of Directors,
which is made up of twenty members elected by the IBA general
body. The community residents on this Board of Directors work
effectively in guiding the programs. More importantly, they
have for the past twelve years clearly represented the voice of
the broader IBA body. The IBA Board should remain the final
voice on commercial development decisions.
Now, there is a Business Advisory Board, a subcommittee
of the IBA Board, which is made up of outside professionals.
This Advisory Board will work directly with the Commercial
Development staff on RLF selection and approval of ventures to
finance. However, at least two IBA Board members should be on
this Business Advisory Board to insure maintainence of the
community's best interests. The evaluative role which the
Business Advisory Board occupies gives the IBA Board a close
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view of the RLF program so it can make more informed decisions.
This structure is already partially in place and will serve
well to fill a possible information gap. Two IBA Board members
should augment the Advisory Board's effectiveness. Advisory
Board members should make recommendations to the IBA Board on
what ventures to finance with the RLF.
To institutionalize the RLF program IBA could integrate
into the South End Credit Union. The integration should be
slow to allow the inexperienced staff of the South End Credit
Union to learn about commercial lending. Perhaps a position
on the Business Advisory Board could be occupied by the loan
officer of the Credit Union. Moreover, the Credit Union would
work well as a servicer of outstanding RLF direct loans. Making
the South End Credit Union part of the RLF program will probably
improve its chances of success and would certainly continue to
fostor the well integrated and comprehensive planning approach
IBA has used in the past.
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Chapter Five
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IBA's RLF
AS AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TOOL
Major problems in minority small business development in
the South End divide into two categories: financial and opera-
tional. The financial problems result from market imperfections
and operational difficulties arise from managerial inadequacies.
The ability of the RLF to effect either of these areas deter-
mines its use as an economic development tool.
Ability To Cope With
Capital Market Imperfections
By providing capital specifically for minority small
businesses, the RLF begins to work on one of the major problems
confronting the South End entrepreneurs - capital availability.
Availability of capital is key to development, but the amount
and form is just as important. The amount of capital the RLF
is making available to minority entrepreneurs is between
$65,000 and $100,000.1 Through leveraging it is projected that
this total amount may triple to $195,000 and $300,000, respect-
ively. Even though this is not a substantial capitalization
when compared to the MURAG/CRRLF or the EBCDC/RLGF, in relative
terms, the impact on the IBA community may be great because
IBA is concentrating in one small area.
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MURAG and EBCDC, on the other ahd, are covering a large
geographic area and target population. MURAG's CRRLF, for
instance, covers the Dorchester neighborhood which is approx-
imately fourteen times the geographic area of the IBA RLF
target area (see Appendix Ten). Furthermore, IBA is concentra-
ting its efforts in the South End Plaza Betances and surrounding
shopping area (see Appendix Seven), while MURAG is covering
eight commercial nodes in the Dorchester neighborhood.
2
The area IBA is attempting to effect has only one lending
institution located within its neighbothood boundary, so making
capital available from the RLF and banks outside of the South
End neighborhood will be significant.3 It is clear that what-
ever the circumstances, making more capital available for
minority business development is correcting a market imperfec-
tion.
Facilitating access to capital resources previously
"untapped" is one of the main purposes of the RLF. By reducing
a bank's exposure to risk through loan guarantees previously
inaccessible capital will hopefully flow into financing of
minority small businesses. Reduction of transaction and infor-
mation cost will also serve as an incentive to induce banks to
invest. Modifying bank lending policy by incentive is, theore-
tically, how the access is achieved. The EBCDC/RLGF program
has shown empirically that this is possible (see Chapter Four's
background section for more detailed information). Simply put,
without reduction of costs, risks, or some type of incentive,
banks would not place the capital in the financing of minority
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small businesses. Since the RLF has this feature and others
(i.e. direct loan and equity investments) to reduce banks risks
it will probably achieve its goal of correcting the access
problem.
In addition, it is hoped that individuals given a guarantee
or some other sort of assistance, that successfully pay off
their loan to a bank, will be able to approach the bank without
the assistance of the RLF. A rapport, trust or credibility bond
will be nurtured between the lender and lendee by the RLF. This
bond may lead to lending without RLF assistance. The RLF could
be the community-based link which will bridge the financing gap.
The market imperfection of prejudice is dealt with directly
by lending only to those minority entrepreneurs who have been
refused financing. Obviously, every minority entrepreneur that
is refused financing before coming to the RLF will not have been
prejudged by the lender. However, those whose applications
receive racial or geographic prejudice will be dealt with.
Indirectly, capital placement policy may be effected by
the fact that the RLF officer/manager interacts with the lender.
Once a rapport between the RLF officer/manager and the lender is
established, it is hoped that the lender might begin to see that
people of a particular race or geographic area are just as
reliable as others. The lender's perceptions might also be
effected by those candidates that are lended to through the RLF.
If these candidates demonstrate that preconceived notions about
racial group or gepgraphic area were incorrect, the prejudice
problem could be further ameliorated. It is hoped that the
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lender may generalize the positive perceptions of the RLF
officer/manager and successful lendees.
The cost of information and transaction is lowered directly
by the RLF's design features - specifically, the assessment of
entrepreneur's skills, technical assistance, the approval
process, and monitoring of persons receiving RLF assistance
reduces these costs. By weeding out the most risky candidates
the RLF reduces unnecessary paperwork for the bank.
The cost of information is further reduced by the
selection and approval processing requirements. Background and
plans of the minority entrepreneur and his or her business are
required. Also, a credit check is performed through the Boston
Credit Bureau and/or TRW to further validate an individual's
creditworthiness. Finally, personal data collected from
community members that are knowledgeable of the entrepreneur's
general reliability, trustworthiness, and other personality
characteristics may be collected.
Transaction costs to the lender could be reduced by the RLF
monitoring process. Updates on business progress can be pro-
vided within a few days on a request from the bank. These
incentives could induce a lender into a RLF deal and thereby
effect the capital placement policy of the lender.
The risk aversity of a lender should be directly affected
by the reduction of both real and perceived risk. Real risk
could more than likely be reduced by the RLF weeding process
which includes:
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1. Assessment of the entrepreneur's skills.
2. Selection and approval process.
3. Monitoring of outstanding loan process.
The collection of data on the personal character of the
entrepreneur, coupled with the liaison role of the RLF officer/
manager may reduce perceived risk. Finally, both real and
perceived risk may be lowered by an RLF guarantee, direct loan
or equity investment. All of these features of the RLF program
design add to its ability to reduce risk aversity.
In summation, the design features of the RLF cope with the
market imperfections of the South End-minority small business
environment described in Chapter One. The design and management
components of the RLF vary in their ability to cope with the
capital placement-problems, but it is clear that the community-
based RLF can be an effective tool for correcting market imper-
fection and subsequently, economic development activities. The
next section pinpoints the manner in which the RLF attempts to
resolve some of the operational problems of minority small
businesses.
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Ability To Provide Technical Assistance
Competence and managerial expertise can be acquired through
education or experience. IBA's RLF program does not have the
staff capacity nor the economic resources to provide the tech-
nical assistance necessary to overcome the severe managerial
inadequacies of many of the minority small businesspersons of
the South End. To begin resolving some of these managerial
difficulties, IBA is providing some direct technical assistance
in the form of advice on marketing, inventory changes, and
store improvements. This sort of assistance is not extensive,
but it can have far reaching effects.
In an effort to expand its technical assistance capacity,
linkages will be established with the Small Business Development
Corporation and the Small Business Administration. These
agencies offer seminars which train small businesspersons in
financial planning, marketing and business management. The
services of these agencies can be obtained either free or at a
nominal cost.
In addition to these resources, it would be wise for IBA to
investigate the possibility of utilizing some of the educational
resources in the Boston/Cambridge area. By working through
community relations offices of an educational institution, the
IBA RLF program might be able to arrange a special workshop.
By providing direct and indirect technical assistance IBA
will be helping the inexperienced entrepreneur. However, it is
important to note that education can never replace practical
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experience. The goal of IBA's RLF program will be to assist
the entrepreneur in avoiding the most detrimental problems.
The technical assistance will help small businesses
cope with insufficient planning while IBA's business promotion
program for Plaza Betances will improve part of the marketing
problem. Many of the first entrepreneurs assisted by the RLF
will be located in the Plaza Betances commercial space due
to open in November of 1981. This space, located on West
Dedham Street will provide business promotion through the
local media for the Plaza in general. Nevertheless, market-
ing for specific businesses inside and those located outside
Plaza Betances must still be done. At present, the technical
assistance is available to fill this void.
Minority small business entrepreneurs of the South End,
like those throughout the United States, often hire relatives
to fill positions in their businesses. This often cuts down
on overhead costs and sometimes insures the owner/operator
that the employee has an interest in the business. There is,
however, one great problem with this method of staffing - the
family member or relative is not always appropriate for the
position offered in the business.
For instance, an entrepreneur may hire his cousin to
wait on customers. The cousin may have a bad disposition.
Since the interpersonal manner of a person serving a customer
can effect whether or not the customer returns, a poor dis-
position could effect the viability of the business.
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The RLF cannot effect the hiring policy of the entrepreneur
but it can make contingencies in its financing package. These
contingencies could be targeted at the staff person's attitude
in the above-cited example. These contingencies should be
designed to improve the businesses' viability.
The problem of security can be aleviated by the RLF in
numerous ways. One way is to encourage the businessperson to
share the cost of hiring a security guard. Another is by
contracting IBA's existing twenty-four hour security service.
For the RLF program, participants moving into the Plaza Betances
commercial space will be charged a security fee, to be incor-
porated in the rental fee of the space.
The effectiveness of IBA's RLF as an economic development
tool is limited by its initial capitalization, staff capacity,
and economic resources for operation. Since the RLF target
area and population are small, its potential for success is
enhanced. The resourcefulness of the staff operating the RLF
and their ability to identify good candidates for financing will
determine its overall effectiveness.
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FOOTNOTES
John Riordan, Assistant For Development, "Proposal To
Establish A Revolving Loan And Equity Fund For Minority
Small Business Development" (Boston, MA: Inquilinos
Boricuas En Accion, 1980), p. 4.
2 Betsy Churchill, Steve Klionsky, and Betsy Manning,
"Revolving Loan Funds And Community Investment: The
Case Of MURAG And The CRRLF," an unpublished paper
(Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School Of Public Policy,
Harvard University, January, 1981), p. 9.
3 Interview with Hector Melendez, Assistant Director of
Development, Inquilinos Boricuas En Accion, March, 1981.
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Chapter Six
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The following recommendations are divided into sub-categor-
ies for organizational purposes. Sub-categories are recommen-
dations relating to the RLF:
1. Staff
2. Technical Assistance
3. Selection And Approval Process
4. Credibility
5. Fund Management
6. Expansion
Staff
The RLF loan officer/manager sould have knowledge of basic
finance and accounting principles. Additionally, he or she
should be bi-lingual (Spanish and English) and aware of the
financial and operational needs of minority small business-
persons.
The person monitoring the outstanding loans, loan
guarantees and equity investments should have, at a minimum,
a Bachelor of Science in Accounting (preferably, Public
Accounting Certification).
Since the RLF staff will be working in conjunction with
the financial, governmental and local community members, it
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is imperative that the staff is capable of working effectively
with people of diverse interests and ethnic backgrounds.
While negotiating with lending institutions, the RLF loan
officer/manager should advocate on behalf of the minority
entrepreneur. The loan officer/manager's objective should be
twofold: first, to clarify the case of the potential lendee
and second, to obtain the best financing terms for the lendee
and the RLF.
Technical Assistance
It is essential that technical assistance in the form of
planning, bookkeeping and marketing be provided by the RLF
program to successfully cope with the operational problems of
minority entrepreneurs.
Because the staff capacity and financial resources of the
RLF are limited, the RLF should establish technical assistance
linkages with the Small Business Development Corporation, the
Small Business Administration, educational institutions (i.e.
Northeastern University) and government and private agencies,
which can assist minority entrepreneurs. Educational seminars
and training sessions should be promoted by the staff during
the community outreach to assist those entrepreneurs with
operational problems.
One of the objectives of community outreach should be to
facilitate the organization of an active business association.
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This will promote self-sufficiency among the businesses in their
endeavor to build political and economic strength. A formal
political voice from the business community could possibly
effect the placement of capital in the South End. The "grass
roots" political approach was critical to IBA's development and
will be critical to the business community's development.
Specifically, the minority entrepreneurs should be
encouraged to:
1. improve the exterior and interior appearance
of their establishments;
2. diversify their product line and marketing
approach to capture more of the upper income
market;
3. improve their bookkeeping methods; and,
4. reduce the crime near their businesses.
In all the above cases, pooling of costs should be
encouraged and, if possible, arranged. For example, security
services could be contracted from IBA and supported by a fee
from the entrepreneurs. In another case, an accountant which
specializes in small business bookkeeping could be identified
by an RLF staff member and, subsequently, contracted to do the
books of group of businesses with similar accounting needs.
Selection And Approval Process
The role of the loan officer/manager should be to recruit,
screen, and recommend candidates to be considered for assistance
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by the RLF. In addition, the loan officer/manager should
assist the entrepreneur with the preparation of business
plans for the establishment. The role of
The role of the Business Advisory Board should be to
evaluate the business plan and entrepreneur, and make recommen-
dations to the IBA Board of Directors for final approval.
The role of the IBA Board should be to:
1. insure that appropriate criteria for selection
and evaluation were utilized by the Business
Advisory Board in the consideration for RLF
financing;
2. make sure that the community's best interests are
being served by the venture; and
3. have the final approval or disaproval power over
over financing of a venture.
The IBA Board represents the community. Therefore, allocation
of RLF resources should ultimately be determined by the IBA
Board.
The selection and approval process should be streamlined
as much as possible to avoid unnecessary work. Standardization
of applications, business plans, and evaluation forms could
result in a more fluid flow of information and, thereby, reduce
the amount of time involved in processing.
The Business Advisory Board should have at least two
members of the IBA Board on it to increase the IBA Board's
awareness of commercial development activities and the RLF
evaluation process. Having IBA Board members on the Business
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Advisory Board would also put the IBA Board in a more active
position in the RLF financing process.
If the RLF program is going to become institutionalized it
should begin working with the South End Credit Union. This
credit union was initiated by IBA and has close political and
cultural ties. Since it is the first Hispanically owned and
operated financial institution in New England, it is the type
of institutionalized entity which could assist in the continu-
ation of the RLF program after the staff positions are defunded.
To begin an interactive process, it would be wise to appoint
one credit union staff person to the Business Advisory Board.
By doing this, the staff person will gain an intimate under-
standing of the workings of the RLF. Detailed knowledge of the
program can lead to easier incorporation of the RLF into the
credit union.
Credibility
Initial loans should be used to establish credibility in
the lending community and the South End business community in
the target area. This means carefully scrutinizing the first
seven to ten ventures. Close examination of personal background
and business plans will reveal an entrepreneur's potential for
success.
Records of all rejections and acceptances should be kept
so that the important in'dicators can be isolated, and serve as
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a guide to improve the selection of successful ventures. A
tremendous amount of learning will occur in the first seven
to ten ventures financed. Therefore, risky ventures should be
avoided. That is to say, start-ups and equity investments
should not be financed in the first nine months of RLF operation
to preserve credibility.
Loan guarantees and direct loans which leverage private or
public capital should compose ninety percent of the RLF loan
portfolio in the first year.
First priority for RLF financing should be given to those
ventures locating in IBA's Plaza Betances commercial space, who
provide a vital service, cultural enriching service, or employ-
ment to community members. Ideally, the owners of these
establishments assisted will be residents of the South End.
A monitoring process should take place monthly and a formal
process should take place quarterly. High risk lending (both
perceived or real) requires close attention. Therefore, a site
visit to the establishment, or a phone call to the lender con-
cerning guarantees should not be considered abnormal.
An evaluation process should take place semi-annually.
The process and outcome measures specified within this text
should be used to assess the effectiveness of the RLF program
and to reveal whether some modification is necessary.
To avoid conflicts of interest during the selection and
approval process, IBA Board and Business Advisory Board members
who are either friends or relatives of a potential lendee should
be temporarily replaced by impartial members of both Boards
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for the duration of the evaluation and approval process.
Fund Management
1. Loans should not exceed $10,000 for an RLF operational-
ized at $65,000 and $100,000.
2. Loan guarantees should not exceed twenty percent of the
total financing package.
3. The lendee should be required to contribute between
ten and fifteen percent of the total financing package in
liquid or fixed assets.
4. Loan collateralization should be kept flexible, however,
items such as equipment, real estate, inventory, automobiles
and other physical assets, with a bluebook or resale value
approximately equivalent to the size of the loan, will
probably be required by the lending institution. Similar
collateralization should be used for direct loans.
5. Any interest earned on RLF loans should be added to the
pool of capital to maintain it's "real" value.
Expansion
1. The South End Credit Union and the RLF should establish
a matching commercial lending program where both put up an
equivalent amount of capital to increase public and private
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leveraging potential. This should be encouraged after the RLF
has provided its first few loans or if a large non-risky
project becomes available.
2. RLF staff should encourage persons that have received
assistance previously from the RLF to pursue conventional
financing. Hopefully, the creditworthiness of the entrepreneur
will have been enhanced by the RLF track record and, subsequen-
tly, baniks will be more willing to lend.
3. After the fikst nine months, and once some loans have been
issued, alternative sources for increasing the RLF capital
pool should be sought. Using the RLF track record and repu-
tability gained through working with lending institutions,
money could be obtained from corporations, foundations, or the
government.
4. After the first nine months, RLF staff should begin to
develop a strategy to more deeply involve banks in the RLF
program. They should request amounts matching RLF capitali-
zation and indicate how the RLF can lower risk, and information
and transaction costs.
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CONCLUSION
The central question of this thesis is whether or
not IBA, a community-based development organization, can
successfully guide the appropriate and efficient placement
of capital in its community and, subsequently, gain greater
control over community economic resources by utilizing the
RLF program. IBA's organizational development and record
of achievement in housing, social service, and to a limited
extent, commercial development, indicates that the agency
has the vital elements necessary to effectively utilize a
capital market perfecting mechanism.
The organization's ability to mobilize the political
power of its community and determine its own future is
evident. In addition, the leadership's knowledge and
responsiveness to community needs reveals a critical link
between the member and the decision making process. This
link, along with a strong cultural identity, has served to
keep the community united against outside forces. These
characteristics, along with well planned and executed
development activity, have all contributed to IBA's success.
In the attempt to implement an RLF program which will
cope with both the financing and operational needs of its
minority entrepreneural community, IBA must re-educate
financing institrtions with regard to lending policies for
minority small businesses, and provide technical assistance
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to minority entrepreneurs. This dual educational process
is both political and economic in its implications for
policy formulation.
IBA's ability to achieve the above mentioned tasks is
limited by the level of capitalization of the RLF,, the
number of staff persons available to provide technical
assistance, and the receptiveness of lenders and minority
entrepreneurs to IBA working as a liaison. In spite of
these limitations and seemingly overwhelming objectives,
IBA will be able to effect the placement of capital in its
target area and thereby gain greater control of economic
resources.
The use of political power to effect external.
institutions is not new to IBA. Even though these institu-
tions are mostly private, they nonetheless do respond to the
demands of communities. The success of organizations like
the East Boston Community Development Corporation and the
Massachusetts Urban Reinvestment Advisory Group support the
fact that financing institutions can serve the capital
needs of all communities, even those with low and moderate
income residents.
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Appendix Two
Villa Victoria Primary Market Area
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Appendix Three
Computation Of Gap Between Sales
And Potential For Market Area Retailers
Business Type
COMPUTATION OF GAP BETWEEN SALES AND POTENTIAL FOR MARKET AREA RETAILERS
Square Footage Estimated Estimated
No. of Outlets of Outlets $ Sales/Sq.Ft. $ Sales Sales Potential
Discount Department
Stores
Eating Places
Supermarkets
Grocery Stores
Florists
Drugstores
Dry Cleaners
Liquor Stores
Hardware Stores
Drinking Places
Barber Shops
Shoe Stores
Men's Clothing
Women's Clothing
Family & Other
Clothing
Laundramats
Bakeries
Beauty Shops
Meat & Poultry
0
3Z
2.
27
9
6
5
10
3
16
2.
0
5
2.
0
38,000
-25, 000
22,000
10,000
10,000
9,500
21,000
12,000
20,000
6,500
500
500
500
6,0000
1,500
0
4,000
5,000
48
51
133
60
50
65
34
80
43
NA
39
36
68
63
66
15
48
50
180
0
1,938,000
3,325,000
1,320,000
500,000
650,000
323,000
1,680,000
516,000
NA
253,000
18,000
34,000
31,500
396,000
22,500
0
200,000
900,000
5,184, 000
1,305,738
18,940,000
74,000
2,450,970
143,000
469,000
551,000
NA
165,000
161,000
265,000
252,000
256,000-
95,000
100,000
239,000
330,000
5,184,000
(632,262)
14,295,000
(426,000)
1,800,970
(180,000)
(1,211,000)
35,000
NA
(88, 000)
143,000
231,000
493,500
(140,000)
72,500
100,0(10
39,000
(570, 000)
Hj
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Appendix Four
1975 Per Capita Income BZ Census Tract
1975 Per Capita Income By Census Tract
Mean Income
for Families
and Unrelated
Individuals-
Tot a l
Fami lies
and Unrelated
x Individuals = Total Income -Total Pop. .
Per Capita
Income
1970
Per Capita
Income With
35% Inflator*
$ 6172
5177
5294
5134
49 OT
4383
4364
3480
4466
4243
2137
614
2544
1692
378
1580
1144
901
55.4
940
$ 13,18'9,564
3,178,678
13,467,936
8,686,728
1,852,578
6,925,140
4,992,416
3,135,480
2,474,164
3,988,420
2968
1708
5051
2465
696
2379
*2046.
1201
733
2407
4444
1861
2666
3524
2662
2911
2440
2611
3375
1657
$ 6000
2512
3599
4757
3594
3930
3294
3525
4556
2237
H
L~J
LA)
* Adjusted for inflation between 1970 and 1975.
Tract
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
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Appendix Five
Market Area Map B Census Tract
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Appendix Six
South End Activity Centers Plan
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Appendix Seven
Villa Victoria Map
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Appendix Eight
IBA Organizational Chart
IBA Organizational Chart
ETC Management Company
(business affiliate)
P.D. = Project Director H-
Executive Office
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Appendix Nine
Methodology Of Research And Design
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Methodology Of Research And Design
The Process
This thesis is the culmination of over twenty-seven
interviews and approximately 100 informal and formal meetings.
The process of research and design consisted of self-initiated
and client-initiated tasks. Unlike many academic research
endeavors, practically every aspect of the program was scruti-
nized during the development process.
During the first two weeks of interaction with the client,
a bond of trust and mutual respect had to be established. The
purpose of these bonds were to insure the quality and applica-
bility of the product. Without an honest and egalitarian
interactive process between the consultant and client, quality
and applicability would have been questionable.
This thesis is a "snap shot" of space (i.e. IBA) and time
(i.e. spring, 1981).1 By freezing the activities of the
organization of human beings, the "participant observer" role,
which the researcher occupied, can be clearly delineated2 and
juxtaposed to that of the client in some instances. Howevever,
in other instances, the "participant observer" takes on an
"objective analyst" position and it is difficult to detect
because of the researcher's preconceptions and certain vested
interests which conflicted with the interests of the client.3
This is one of the dangers of the involved process of planning/
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implementation on the community level. 4
The Roles During Capitalization,
Design of RLF Components,
And Management Plan Phases
In the first two weeks of thesis research, the author, for
the most part, occupied the role of the objective analyst.
Once the problem was defined, the organization understood and
the tasks laid out shifted the role of the author to implementor.
The implementation activities consisted of writing letters
to foundations and corporations in the name of the client.
Also, telephoning and interviews, on behalf of the agency, were
necessary. All these activities combined to form a belief, in
the author's mind, that he was in fact inextricably interwoven
into the fabric of the organization. Admittedly, the amiable
behavior of the staff members and constant reinforcement that
his behavior was appropriate, nurtured this perception. Since
capitalization of the financing mechanism was so critical, the
author felt justified in becoming imbued with the thought of
becoming a member of the agency.
As task emphasis shifted from capitalization to design of
the RLF program, the conciousness and demeanor of the author
adapted. The design tasks necessitated that the author take a
more objective approach. Returning to the role of the objective
analyst, he began gathering and analyzing data on other RLF's in
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the Boston area. Additionally, the author sought and obtained
extensive amounts of information on the development of small
businesses. Interviews, statistical data bases, and client
needs guided much of the research.
Once the information was compiled and analyzed, the design
phase began to take on two dimensional characteristics - that
is to say, the author began formalizing the information into a
report. This preliminary design report forced the author to
move into the role of the planner. By visualizing the possible
vicissitudes of the organization and the future community needs,
the author planned a flexible design which would permit the
projected organizational and community changes.
With the completion of the program design, the author
returned to the client to discuss the feasibility of the design
in terms of the organization's needs and capacity. Moreover,
the acceptability of the design as far as the community was
concerned was a tantamount consideration. On the one hand,
the fact that the client had not reviewed and analyzed all the
information that the author compiled put the client at a dis-
advantage. On the other hand, the author's lack of knowledge
concerning the organizational and community politics put him
at a disadvantage. Clear, honest appraisal of the institutional
constraints from the external and internal perspectives created
a mutual learning and educating interactive process between
client and author. By the end of the interaction (one week of
meetings with revisions and approvals) the client and the author
both were pleased with the results.
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Conceptually, the process of design looked like this:
-REVISION*
PLANNING -IMPLEMENTATION )EVALUATION
To illustrate this point, initially the author had assumed that
a staff of three persons was not unrealistic. Nonetheless, when
discussion of implementation began it became apparent that this
subject begged evaluation. A quick evaluation revealed that the
man hours involved would cost too much for the agency to handle,
so revision insued to adjust to the new manpower situation.
In the management plan section, information on investment
criteria and indicators of business viability had to be obtained.
The research again took the form of personal interview and
secondary research. Analysis and compilation of this informa-
tion moved the author into the objective analyst role. This
role also lead the author to literature on capital placement
in communities of color.
With the analysis complete, the role of the planner, and
the cycle of planning, implementation, evaluation, and revision
returned. The fact that the RLF would not be regulated by the
federal government's normal rules for financial institutions
provided advantages, but made this process crucial to the
operationalization of the fund.
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Observations
While working at IBA the author made numerous observations
on the organizational characteristics of the agency. Since
specifics are not necessary to clarify a valuable point,
generalizations have been developed to indicate the character-
istics the author thought were valuable in making the agency
and the project successful (i.e. effective in implementation):
1. Strong, well-defined leadership.
2. Relaxed working environment.
3. Trust between staff members.
4. Pride in the Puerto Rican culture.
5. Commitment to the community's development.
6. Slow, organic growth of the organization.
7. Task orientation in implementation.
8. Community participation and support of projects.
These factors may be generalized to help other agencies, but
are difficult to measure in quantitative terms.
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FOOTNOTES
Discussion by Frank Jones, Professor, Department Of
Urban Studies And Planning, Massachusetts Institute
Of Technology, May, 1981.
2 Kenneth B. Clark, Youth In The Ghetto (Harlem, NY:
New York Youth Opportunities Unlimited, Inc. (HARYOU),
1964), p. 58.
I.B.I.D.
Jones Discussion, May, 1981.
I.B.I.D.
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Appendix Ten
Planning Districts, Boston, Massachusetts
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EAST BOSTON
CHARLESTOWN
SOUTH BOSTON
CENTRAL
BACK BAY/BEACON HILL
SOUTH END
FENWAY/KENMORE
ALLSTON/BRIGHTON
9 JAMAICA PLAIN
10 ROXBURY
11A DORCHESTER (North)
11B DORCHESTER (South)
12 ROSLINDALE
13 WEST ROXBURY
14 HYDE PARK
15 MATTAPAN/FRANKLIN FIELD
PLANNING DISTRICTS
Boston, MA
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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Appendix Eleven
Cost-Benefit Analysis Of Alternative Financing
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On the following page is a rough cost-benefit analysis
of the alternative methods of lending and investing which are
included in the RLF guidelines. It should be noted that cost-
benefit analysis is merely a framework for comparing alterna-
tives for decision making.
Quantitative Costs Benefits
Criteria # Control $ For # Control $ For
Alt. $ $ Staff of Fin.. Servic- $ $ Staff of Fin. Servic-
Methods Risk -everage 1st. Yr. Terms ing Risk Leverage 1st. Yr. Terms ing
Bank:
RLF
Gra Low 1 None Low Low RLF, 1 LowGuarantees $3:$1
RLF Minimum,
Direct Loans Medium Variabl 1.5 High ariable Total
RLF Equity . Minimum, Medium ariable Total
Investments High Variabl 1.5
Qualitative Costs Benefits
Criteria IBA Innovat- Bank/Lender IBA Innovat- Bank/Lender
Alt. Community ive Fin. Community Community ommunit ive Fin. Community Community
Methods Image Arrangmt. Control Image Image Arrangmt. Control Image
RLF Veryrae None L e Good GoodGuarantees Noe Little
RLF Direct
Loans
RLF Equity
Investments
Very
Good Some Much Good
It-- I I I II---- I I I-
3xcellent
I ______________ -- tI~
Much Much VeryGood
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